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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline.1
The following pages share the insight of Professor Michael G. Dawson
that even middle-class African-Americans deem their own personal destinies
as bound to that of their race. Improving class status deepens the perception
of group interest in the minds of prospering African-Americans. One might
speculate that enriched educational achievement on the part of such
individuals would debilitate this perceived attachment to their race. Rather,
education accompanies an opposite effect. Political scientist Claudine Gay
argues that the material cause of African-Americans' continuing racial
identification lies in their neighborhoods' unsatisfying quality. As the
residential payoffs to African-American middle-class status expand, racial
sensitivity could evanesce. The prominence of race in individuals' psycho-
logies might prove a function of neighborhood socioeconomic phenomena.
Residential choices in America are exposed to political machinations.
These include real estate regulations along the lines of "open-space" laws
enforced by local authorities at the behest of the local rich. African-
Americans are aware of the vital role of homeownership in group advance-
ment. Unfortunately, legal controls on real estate can exclude African-
I "[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colorline."W. E. B. DU BOIS,
THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK vii (1983), quoted in Le Von E. Wilson & George Steven Swan, The Law and
Policy of Civil Rights: A Tactical Perspedivefor Educators, 14 EXPLORATIONS ETHNIC STUDIES 57,57 (1991).
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Americans-or even extrude resident African-American populations-from
a community. The residential colorline is the central characteristic distin-
guishing African-Americans from every other tile in America's ethnic
mosaic.
Historically, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal spawned long-
lived federal housing credit programs. Practically, these programs proved
venomously exclusionary of African-Americans. The federal government
ratified overt racial discrimination. Comparably lethal to African-American
dreams for access to homes comparable to white Americans' access was the
famed G.I. Bill of Rights, itself a product of President Roosevelt's
administration. Decades of political incrementalism has helped to erect an
edifice of defacto segregated housing.
Affirmative action in housing might mark an incremental method
whereby diversity among residential districts-some becoming racial
checkerboards-simultaneously must mean racial diversity within at least
some such precincts. Can tax policy be harnessed toward such an end? For
over two decades Low Income Housing Tax Credits have encouraged the
conjuring of residences allotted, long-term, to lower income households.
Racial affirmative action diversity in housing would not run counter to the
affirmative action paradigm familiar from employment, and from
educational diversity experiments. Indeed, the call for diversity in student
bodies emerged originally from an awareness of the artificial lack of
suburban residential diversity. As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court
sanctioned diversity as a critical variable in legitimatizing affirmative action
in higher education.
But do not Supreme Court precedents obstruct a Congressional
progressive reform of our tax law in 2007 to encourage affirmative action in
housing? The scholarship of the renowned Professor Laurence H. Tribe
suggests that they need not. In any case, the years-ago advocacy research of
Chief Justice John Roberts teaches America anew the old lesson that
Congress can finesse any such difficulties in advance. Congress can so move
thanks to its option of implementing federal courtjurisdictional reforms, in
tandem with pro-diversity, housing affirmative action legislation.
II. ENHANCED CLASS STATUS REINFORCES RACIAL AFFINITY: THE
INSIGHTS OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL C. DAWSON
A deep level of attachment to an expansive federal government clearly
divides African-Americans from Euro-Americans. An historical sense of
2 STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE
NATION, INDIVISIBLE 304 (1997).
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vulnerability haunts African-American political attitudes.3 In supposing that
the destiny of their race hinges upon a governmental helping hand-and that
only the forceful presence of that hand holds their racial foes at arm's
length-most African-American voters remain in the camp ofjust one of the
two major political parties.4 According to the savviest of analysts, African-
Americans, it is said, share an appreciation for the necessity of, and efficacy
of, taking the political initiative collectively:5 "Even the middle class views
its hard-won status as fragile, with the consequence that individual blacks see
their own fate as tied to that of the race, the political scientist Michael
Dawson has persuasively argued."6
Professor Dawson, in his Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-
American Politics,7 warns:
Consider two black lawyers. One is a recent graduate from an elite
law school who is working at a major corporation or law firm. She
is earning an excellent salary that is at least somewhat on par with
those of her white classmates. The other is an older lawyer who was
not allowed to go to an elite law school and has a practice based in
the black community. This lawyer's income hardly matches the
salary of the other lawyer, but both share the same occupation. In
this case, income better captures the disparities between class
segments than does occupation. Income and education are the
primary class measures used in this study.8
Dawson's work drew upon the National Black Election Panel Study
(NBES) of 1984-1988. 9 It consisted of a national telephone survey wherein
1,150 interviews were conducted with adult African-Americans.1" The
NBES represented one of the most extensive political surveys of the African-
American populace to have been conducted." It delivered both economic
and general metrics of absolute and relative group status:'2 "These measures
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002).
6 THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 304.
MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICS (1994).
8 Id. at 75.
9 Id. at 77.
10 Id.
II Id.
12 Id.
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allow us to compare the different hypotheses according to which the most
important determinants of political choice are based on class, individual
utility, evaluations of what is good for society, or racial group utility,
respectively."0
3
There clearly exists a relationship between socioeconomic status and the
perception of economic subordination. 14 Preliminarily, those enjoying
greater education and status are more likely than their less-blessed kin to
believe that African-Americans (as a group) are in a poor economic state,
absolutely and relatively.' 5 Occupation, apparently, contributes slight
information to that afforded from education and income.'6 Even as late as
2004, it seemed that employment status never yet had been utilized in
models predicting black racial attitudes. 7
The concept of linked fate explicitly ties perceived self-interest to per-
ceived racial group interests.' 8 African-American group interest has served
as a proxy for self-interest. 19 This concept of linked fate was measured
during 1984 and 198820 (along with the aforementioned perception of the
economic subordination of African-Americans). 2' Heed the results
emphasized by Dawson:
However, the more education one had, the more likely one was
to believe that blacks were economically subordinate to whites, and
consequently, the more likely one was to believe that one's fate was
linked to that of the race. Education thus had the opposite effect from the
one predicted by those who believed that increased opportunities for blacks
should lead to a weakening ofperceived attachment to the race.'
Perceptions of relative group influence assist in predicting someone's
political orientation.23 In questions about the relative influence of African-
Americans, and Euro-Americans, in 1984 and 1988 there was scant
13 Id.
14 Id. at 79.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Claudine Gay, Putting Race in Context: Identifing the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial
Attitudes, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 547, 551 n.5 (2004).
18 DAWSON, supra note 7, at 76.
19 Id. at 77.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 79.
22 Id. at 81-82. (emphasis in original).
23 Id. at 86.
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disagreement among blacks over whether African-Americans had adequate
influence.24 Of 1984, Dawson again waxes emphatic:
In 1984, all variables except those relating to age contributed to
the perception that whites have too much influence. Those who
believed that blacks had too little influence, believed that their fate
was linked to that of the race, were more affluent, and believed that
blacks were economically worse off than whites were more likely to
believe that whites had too much influence. Once again, the class
variables have the opposite effects from those one would be led to
expect by those who argue that higher socioeconomic class
correlates with a higher degree of conservatism. Class status and
perceptions ofgroup interests reinforce each other.2s
Somewhat divergent was the 1988 pattern, with class and perceptions of
group interests boasting weaker effects.26
Why, to borrow Dawson's language, have enriched opportunities for
African-Americans not led to a weaker perceived attachment to the race?
'Why has elevated socioeconomic class not correlated with an enhanced
degree of conservatism?
III. NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITYAS MATERIAL ROOT OF RACIAL
AFFINITY: THE INSIGHTS OF PROFESSOR CLAUDINE GAY
A. Gay Isolates the Symptoms
Professor Claudine Gay, during 2004 (in her study, Putting Race in
Context: Identifying the Determinants ofBlack RacialAttitudes)2 7 cited Dawson for
the proposition that individual socioeconomic status impinges upon African-
Americans' racial attitudes. Thereby, higher-status blacks agree the more
fervently that race endures as the definitive element in individual
biographies.28 The higher status African-Americans-measured (typically)
by educational attainment-are more likely than are lower-status African-
Americans to subscribe to ideas of shared fate, and to argue that racial
24 Id.
2 Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
26 Id.
27 Gay, supra note 17, at 547. Prof. Gay is a member of the Stanford University Political Science
Department.
28 Id. at 547 (citing, inter alia, DAWSON, supra note 7).
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membership determines someone's access to economic prospects. 29 Well-
documented is the positive association between individual socioeconomic
status and African-American racial identification, although it remains poorly
understood.30
Results from the 2000 Census indicate that the majority of suburban
African-Americans3 live in racially segregated suburbs. There the degree of
residential segregation is notjust heavy, but is unvaried since 1990. African-
America's urban exodus less serves as a vehicle for racial change than for
economic segregation.32 Economists know how a house's price embeds
information about the value attaching to every type of amenity: quiet,
greenery, shopping, low crime, etc. (The price of identical homes situated
opposite one another probably signals how much people prefer a house
facing the sun).33 Citing the widely-respected study34 by Douglas S. Massey
and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass,35 Gay observes that African-Americans are able to purchase fewer
neighborhood amenities with their income, dollar for dollar, than are other
groups.36 A 2001 Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan
Policy study ascertained that for every dollar of income, African-American
homeowners owned $2.16 worth of house; for each such dollar, white
homeowners owned $2.64 worth of house.37 Residential circumstances
might factor into perceptions of the persistence of race as an overriding
variable in life. 38 For an African-American, the incapacity to secure a
favorable residential environment might facilitate her belief that race still
delimits her hopes for socioeconomic rewards.
39
29 Id. at 549 (citing, inter alia, DAWSON, supra note 7).
30 Id. at 547 n. 1.
31 See, e.g., TOM MARTINSON, AMERICAN DREAMSCAPE: THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN
POSTWAR SUBURBIA (2000); ANDREW WIESE, PLACES OF THEIR OWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN
SUBURBANIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2004).
32 Gay, supra note 17, at 548.
33 TIM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST: EXPOSING WHYTHE RICH ARE RICH, THE
POOR ARE POOR-AND WHYYOU CAN NEVER BUYA DECENT USED CAR! 94 (2006).
34 See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Political Economy ofAmerican "Apartheid": Shaw v. Reno, 11
T. M. COOLEYL. REV. 1, 14(1994).
35 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCYA. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
36 Gay, supra note 17, at 549.
37 David Rusk, The "Segregation Tax": The Cost of Racial Segregation on Black Homeowners, SURVEY
SERIES (The Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2001, at 1, 3, availableat http'//www.brook.edu/es/urban/
publications/rusk.pdf
38 Gay, supra note 17, at 550.
39 Id.
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Gay utilized data from the 1992-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban
Inequality (MCSUI).0 The MCSUI is a linked study of households and
employers in four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los
Angeles County.4' The analysis relied upon survey data for 3,109
respondents who self-identified as black.42 The survey was supplemented
with 1990 Census data on the racial and socioeconomic features of
respondents' neighborhoods. 43 In three of the four metropolitan areas, Gay
found that blacks who live in neighborhoods offering the security that draws
from well-tended homes and easy access to public and private services are
less likely to believe that race endures as the definitive feature of their lives.
Atlanta represents the exception.' Only therein do expressions of linked fate
("Do you think that what happens to [black] people in this country will have
something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot,
some, or not very much?") 4 prove unrelated to neighborhood quality.'
Beliefs concerning barriers to African-American socioeconomic
achievement were tested with the query: "In general, how much discrimina-
tion is there that hurts the chances of [blacks] to get good-paying jobs? Do
you think there is a lot, some, only a little, or none at all?"47 Finds Gay:
'While discrimination and linked fate attitudes are both
responsive to shifts in residential circumstances, African Americans
more readily discard notions of linked fate (i.e., shifting from "a lot"
to "none" or "not very much") than they do their firm belief that
discrimination remains a barrier to black socioeconomic attainment
(i.e., shifting only from "a lot" to "some").'
Whatever the philosophical base underlying block solidarity,49 what
proves its material foundation? After all, African-Americans' continuing
color-consciousness pushes against the (increasingly colorblind) long-term
40 Id. at 550.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id. at 554.
45 Id. at 552.
46 Id. at 554.
47 Id. at 552.
48 Id. at 555.
49 See, e.g., TOMmIE SHELBY, WE WHO ARE DARK: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BLACK SOLIDARITY (2005). "Middle-class blacks, Shelby opines, are preoccupied with the 'public image'
of blackness because they see racial stereotypes as impeding their social mobility (e.g., career
advancement)." Hawley Fogg-Davis, Book Review, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 578,579 (2006).
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tide of American history." Over the past lifetime, for example, the South
switched from its historical partisan affiliation,5' and the latest scholarship
proves that this allegiance shift was not racially motivated. It was predicated
upon class influences and the profound economic evolution of that region.52
B. Gay Diagnoses the Disease
1. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR THOMAS M. SHAPIRO
Gay concludes that the influence of neighborhood quality on the
prominence of race evidences the material roots of African-American racial
identify: "To wit, neighborhood quality affects the salience of race by
providing blacks with an objective basis on which to either accept or reject
the standing belief that their lives remain overly determined by their racial
group membership." 3 The same year in which Gay wrote, Thomas M.
Shapiro elucidated her thinking in different language:
A family's assets, consisting of financial resources like savings
accounts, stocks, bonds, home equity, and other investments, are
not merely means through which they measure success or make a
life. These assets also define a family's community and class status
and racial identity. Our conversations with families will illustrate
how they use assets to establish class, community, and race
boundaries. While it is no longer legal to deny access to housing
based on race, there is no law against keeping out people who
cannot afford a mortgage and thus hoarding community and
educational opportunities. The home we own, how big that home
is, and its location are key statements in our class identity.
Immigrants, Asian Americans, Hispanics, and others form racial
identities in large measure by the characteristics of the communities
they live in. For example, Hispanics who live in predominantly
upper-middle-class white communities and whose children attend
50 "Where minorities arejoined by a sizable nonaffluent white population, the policy preferences
for most whites, African Americans, and Latinos are similar-a development that stimulates leadership
awareness and responsiveness on behalfofall traditionally excluded groups." Linda Faye Williams, Book
Review, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 768, 770 (2006). But c. MICHAEL K BROWN, ET AL., WHITE
WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003).
s1 See, e.g., EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS (2002).
52 See, e.g., BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN
ExCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH (2006).
53 Gay, supra note 17, at 559.
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white schools are far more likely to be treated as and identify as
white than those living in poor nonwhite communities. In contrast,
African Americans can use assets to achieve class status, but where
they live has little consequence for their racial identities. Widespread
residential segregation further restricts African American families
from using assets to break out of racial boundaries.5 4
Gay explains that African-American beliefs regarding race are infused with
a legacy of economic oppression "as opposed to being strictly an expression
of cultural solidarity."
55
2. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR CASS R. SUNSTEIN
That core racial attitudes are influenced by neighborhood socioe-
conomic contexts casts light over the well-documented, albeit paradoxical,
tendency of lower-class African-Americans to feel less racially-oriented than
do middle-class African-Americans.16 Residing primarily among higher-
54 THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HowWEALTH
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 11 (2004). Shapiro is the Pokross Professor of Law and Social Policy at
Brandeis University.
55 Gay, supra note 17, at 559. Grasping the prominence of economic variables-as distinguished
from cultural variables, see, e.g., WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., No COWARD SOLDIERS: BLACK CULTURAL
POLITICS AND POSTWAR AMERICA (2005)--does not require the denial of racial stigma as an important
concept, see, e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, THEANATOMYOF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002), regardingAmerica's
twenty-first culture wars. See, e.g., MATTHEWFRYEJACOBSON, ROOTS TOO: WHITEETHNIC REVIVAL
IN POST-CMLRIGHTSAMERICA (2006); ERIcP. KAUFMANN, THE RISEAND FALLOFANGLO-AMERICA
(2004). These follow the minority rights revolution of a generation past. See, e.g.,JOHN D. SKRENTNY,
THE MINORITYRIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002). The South was turned upside-down after World War I.
See, e.g., PETE DANIEL, LOST REVOLUTIONS: THE SOUTH IN THE 1950s (2000).
Of course, racial discrimination can endure through unconscious assumptions. See, e.g., LU-
IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE (2006); cf. DEIRDRE A.
ROYSTER, RACE AND THE INVISIBLE HAND: How WHITE NETWORKS EXCLUDE BLACK MEN FROM
BLUE-COLLARJOBS (2003).
Sociologist William T. Bielby is the leading courtroom proponent of a simple but powerful
theory: "unconscious bias." He contends that white men will inevitably slight women and
minorities because they just can't help themselves. So he tries to convince judges that no
evidence of overt discrimination-no smoking gun memo, for instance-is needed to prove
a case. As Allen G. King, an employment defense attorney at the Dallas office of Littler
Mendelson, puts it: "Ijust have to leave you to your own devices, and because you are a white
male," you will discriminate.
Michael Orey, White Men Can't Help It: Courts Have Been Buying the Idea that They Have Innate Biases, BUS.
WK., May 15, 2006, at 54, 54. "Plaintiffs have used [University of Pennsylvania] Professor Bielby as an
expert witness in more than fifty cases. . ." Id. at 57.
56 Gay, supra note 17, at 559.
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status blacks may reinforce the supposition that race remains the overriding
element in someone's life. 7 Gay's findings call to mind Cass R. Sunstein's
1999 formulation of his Law of Group Polarization.5 8 Sunstein's Law is
pregnant with implications for legal and economic institutions, and is
(partially) explanatory of extremism.5 9 Group polarization arises when a
deliberating group's membership shifts to a more extreme point, in whatever
direction was indicated by that membership's pre-deliberation tendency:'
"[I]t has been found to matter whether people think of themselves,
antecedently or otherwise, as part of a group having a degree of solidarity. If
they think of themselves in this way, group polarization is all the more
likely, and it is likely too to be more extreme."
61
The political polarization in America of recent decades has been
accompanied closely by fundamental economic and social changes.62 It is
probable that polarization occurs toward heavier ethnic identification.
63
Intragroup discussion can ensure that when an ethnic group, and the
individual members thereof, finish, they feel a far heavier ethnic
identification than had the median member (pre-discussion). 4 Sure enough,
Gay's Boston and Los Angeles survey item research teaches emphatically:
"African Americans who live amongst and interact with highly educated
blacks believe more strongly than socially engaged blacks in less-educated
contexts-or their unengaged neighbors-that race will limit their
opportunities for socioeconomic attainment."
65
57 Id. at 549.
58 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
(2005). His most recent book is CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE (2006). Sunstein is the Karl Llewellyn Distinguished Services Professor ofJurisprudence,
of the University of Chicago Law School and Political Science Department, and is an influential political
and legal theorist.
s9 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10J. OF POL. PHIL. 175, 175-76 (2002).
60 Id. at 178.
61 Id. at 181 (citing PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 73-76 (1999);
Russell Spears et al., De-Individuation and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communications, 29
BRIT.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 121-34 (1990); Douglas Abrams et al., Knowing What to Think by Knowing
Who You Are: Self-Categorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29
BRIT.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 112 (1990)).
62 See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006).
63 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 20 (Chicago Law Sch.John M. Olin Program
in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 91, 2d Series, 1999), available at
http'//www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_76-100/91.CRS.Polarization.pdf.
64 Id. at 22.
65 Gay, supra note 17, at 557 (emphasis in original). "Unfortunately, these items were included
only in the surveys fielded in Boston and Los Angeles; the ... model could be fitted only to those data."
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According to Sunstein:
Informational and reputational forces are very much at work here,
producing cascade effects, and group polarization can lead members
to increasingly extreme positions. It is not too much of a leap to
suggest that these effects are also present within ethnic groups and
even nations, notwithstanding the unusually high degree of national
heterogeneity. 66
Group polarization is likely, even in the face of equality, and of wholly
conscientious attempts to reach both truth and understanding. 67 (Of course,
ascribing to others a singular identity like race constitutes identity thinking
itself negative. 68 That concept was bruited only last year by the Master of
Trinity College, Cambridge, Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1998 for his contributions to the welfare economics field).
What Ellis Cose denominated as the rage of a privileged class69 might emerge
from the frustration middle-class African-Americans sense when struggling
to translate rising incomes, expanded educational credentials, and
occupational mobility, into more desirable residential conditions.
C. Gay Prescribes the Remedy
The "neighborhood gap" is the difference between one's household
income and the quality of one's neighborhood. 70 Results from the 2000
Census disclose that this gap is greater, and is growing with more celerity,
for the most affluent African-Americans than for those near the poverty
level.7 Gay investigated the "neighborhood racial gap," the absolute value of
the difference between the preferred and the actual racial composition of the
neighborhood. This gap proves positively associated with the view that dis-
crimination endures as a roadblock againstAfrican-American socioeconomic
66 Sunstein, supra note 59, at 185.
67 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 27.
68 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY (2006);
Nadine Robitaille, The Illusion of Identity: Nobel Prize-Winner Anartya Sen on Violence, Identity, and
Globalization, SPEAKER SERIES (Int'l Dev. Res. Centre, Ottawa, Ont.), Apr. 2004,
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-96559-201-1-DOTOPIC.html; Anartya Sen, Letter to the Editor, Our
Inspirations from the Past are Selective, WALL ST.J., Apr. 18, 2006, at A19.
69 ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1995).
70 Gay, supra note 17, at 559.
71 Id. (citing JOHN LOGAN, LEWIS MUMFORD CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE & REG'L RESEARCH,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS AND HISPANICS IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2002)).
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success. That result comports with the proposition that unmet residential
preferences breed pessimism over race.72
Gay speculates optimistically of this malady: "If the residential returns
to middle-class status improve-for example, with tougher enforcement of
fair housing laws-the paradox of heightened race consciousness may
disappear."73 Gay patriotically elaborates:
Whether African Americans perceive race as the defining interest
in their lives is of central political importance. A worldview in which
racial group membership is thought to determine one's life chances
underlies support for black political candidates, disposes African
Americans to policy solutions that emphasize government
intervention, and encourages collective mobilization to improve the
status of blacks. Hence, if the salience of race is vulnerable to
processes of neighborhood socioeconomic changes, the political
cohesiveness that this salience sustains may be equally vulnerable.74
So, what is the economics of residence ("the residential returns to middle-
class status")?
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF RESIDENCE
A. The Propertied and the Unpropertied
Real estate is a foundation of life.75 In a country of burgeoning popula-
tion,76 the value of real estate to individuals, and to societies, grows at an
72 Id. at 560 n.15.
73 Id. at 560.
74 Id. Varied are the answers to what limits housing choice (begetting a racially unequal
geography of opportunity), and what are the socioeconomic consequences of this geography. See, e.g.,
THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA
(Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
75 PATRICK K HETRICK& LARRYA. OUTLAW, NORTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE FOR BROKERS
AND SALESMEN 1 (4th ed. 1994).
76 Mexico is the maternity ward of the United States. Approximately one of eight adults born
in Mexico now lives in the United States. ROBERTO SURO, PEWHISPANICCTR.,ATrITUDESTOWARDS
IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY: SURVEYS AMONG LATINOS IN THE U.S. AND MEXICO 14
(2005), available at http/pewhispanic.org/files/reports/52.pdf. In 2005, over 20 percent of nationally
representative samples of Mexicans were inclined to work in the U.S. illegally. Id. at 13. Of course,
public finance shapes American preferences regarding immigration. See, e.g., GORDON H. HANSON,
WHYDOES IMMIGRATION DIVIDEAMERICA? PUBLIC FINANCEAND POLITICALOPPOSITION TO OPEN
BORDERS (2005).
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unprecedented rate. Regulations governing real estate ownership date from
the earliest times. They have evolved into a massive corpus of law.' Scarce
land enhances in value as economic activity spurts. More important, the
wealthy expend more upon better-located residences. To ration the slowly-
adjusting housing supply in response to a growing demand, disproportionate
increases in prices are indispensable, but planning restrictions can halt this
adjustment in supply. 78
Metropolitan fragmentation denotes the phenomenon whereby
suburban communities can break away to found separate political entities.79
Most local governments heavily rely on the property tax (primarily, a tax
levied against the value of land and buildings).' The revenue yield, at a given
rate of taxation, is largely decided by how land is utilized."1 As suburbaniza-
tion ("sprawl"s2) proceeded, 3 local governments realized that they could
wield their police powers to fatten their fisc and yet retain attractive com-
munities, notwithstanding the impact upon neighboringjurisdictions." The
ratio of public service costs to tax revenue tends to be low in high-income
77 HETRICK& OUTLAW, supra note 75, at 1.
78 Martin Wolf, Dangers of Great Housing Market Delusion, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at 4.
79 See, e.g., RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
(2005).
80 DICK NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS: DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 94
(1970).
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY (2005); NATURE IN
FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL (Elizabeth A. Johnson and Michael W. KIemens eds., 2005);
OWEN D. GUTFREUND, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPRAWL: HIGHWAYS AND THE RESHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LANDSCAPE (2004); DOLORES HAYDEN, A FIELD GUIDE TO SPRAWL (2004); ANDROS
DUANY, ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBERK,ANDJEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISEOF SPRAWL,AND
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000); and Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an
Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 301 (2000). The most recent book-length study of sprawl is
WILLIAM T. BOGART, DON'T CALL IT SPRAWL: METROPOLITAN STRUCTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2006). Of course, recent times have wimessed the emergence of edge cities. See, e.g., JON C.
TEAFORD, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF POST-URBAN AMERICA (2006).
83 KEVIN M. KRUSE AND THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY (2006);
DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH, 1820-2000 (2003).
Despite the desires of some new urbanists and "smart growth" activists to cram people into
dense cities and regions, the America of 2050--contrary to the contention of some
demographers-also will likely be far more dispersed. A combination of new
telecommunications technologies and rising land prices will accelerate the shift of population
beyond the current suburban fringes and into the countryside. The demographer Wendell
Cox calls this "sprawl beyond sprawl." It is driven by the simple fact, according to most recent
surveys, that the vast majority of Americans-upward of 80%--still prefer single-family
homes over apartments, while no more than 10% to 15% want to live near the central core.
Joel Kotkin, 400,000,000, WALL ST.J., Oct. 17,2006, at A14.
84 NETZER, supra note 80, at 94-95.
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areas of expensive homes.85 On the other hand, young families with
numerous children of school-age are likely to purchase moderate-value
homes generating a limited tax base.86 Zoning for large minimum-lot sizes
becomes popular.'
The human right to property is a longtime concern of Anglo-American
law,t8 and is expressly protected in our Constitution.89 Notwithstanding the
notion that the human right to property is a perquisite of the rich, such
rights can prove of greater value to the non-rich.90 The non-rich populace
en masse can command far greater wealth than can the plutocracy. Hence,
under laissez faire, numerous holdings of the wealthy would be bid away
from them by the heftier purchasing power of the balance of the citizenry.9'
Entrepreneurs drawing upon borrowed funds can acquire chateaux, to
replace them with abodes for those of modest incomes. 92 Developers are
intermediaries whose strategies are premised upon whatever many other
people are willing to pay for. The genuine competitors bidding against
affluent incumbents in a given area are those would-be buyers and renters
of modest homes.93 Property rights enable mere renters, of moderate
incomes, to throw an aggregate heavy weight in the marketplace. 94 This
85 Id. at 95.
86 Id. Familiar in the study of urban economics is the role of housing. See, e.g., BRENDHAN
O'FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS (2005).
97 NETZER, supra note 80, at 95.
88 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001). So salient toAnglo-American law has become the study of law and
economics that Colin Mayer, the new Dean of Said Business School at Oxford University, anticipates
a masters'-level program "such as joint law and economics targeted at specific consumers such as law
firms and the economics departments of governments." Linda Anderson, Oxford's Said Aims to Compete
with Harvard, FIN. TIMES, December 4, 2006, at FT Rep. 7.
89 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1997). As well it should be so shielded. "Between 1970 and
2004, the homeownership rate climbed to 69% from 63%, even as the physical size of the median new
home grew by nearly 60%." Brink Lindsey, Book view, WALL ST.J., Sept. 21, 2006, at D6. This is the
ordinary American's castle.
90 THOMAS SOWELL, BASICECONOMICS: ACITIZEN'S GUIDETOTHEECONOMY 279 (rev. and
expanded ed. 2004) [hereinafter BASIC ECONOMICS]. Sowell's most recent book is THOMAS SOWELL,
EVERWONDERWHY?:AND OTHER CONTROVERSIAL ESSAYS (2006). Dr. Sowell "laments the fact that
more public intellectuals aren't applying economic analyses to racial policies .. ." Jason L. Riley, The
Weekend Interview with Thomas Sowell: Classy Economist, WALL ST.J., Mar. 25, 2006, at A8.
91 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 279.
92 Id. at 280.
93 THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE 105 (2004).
94 Id. at 104.
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human right to property (of those less well-off) often has been invaded (to
succor the wealthy).'
Those who are vastly propertied can impede such outcomes of liberty,
via choking the human right to property, e.g., through "open space" laws.96
Thereby, well-heeled property-holders can exclude would-be neighbors
earning humbler incomes and yearning to buy shelter for their loved ones.
(The rich simultaneously can boost the prices of their own property, thanks
to its deepening scarcity in relation to an increase in local employment).' 7
Many among those hardest-impacted cannot afford to live in the very
community wherein they toil. Outsiders, once, might have moved in to
potential residences now aborted by open space policies.98
These outsiders' interests could have been championed in the
marketplace by would-be sellers of local land, indulging the legally-
protected right to dispose of their land as they deemed proper.99 The greater
profits must accrue to those existing landholders willing to deal when
developers are at liberty to decide for themselves how many homes per acre
are to be constructed, than when such decisions are extracted from decision-
makers locked into a political straightjacket. The underlying contest erupts
between the prospective purchasers of houses-and-renters of apartments,
and the incumbents voting legislation costless to themselves but laying
grievous burdens upon their fellows."°° Many among the rich have bridled
95 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 279.
% Id. at 280.
W Id. at 281. In many urban centers, large numbers of condominium units-in some instances,
upwards ofone-third-have been purchased by speculators, not by new urbanites.Joel Kotkin, The Ersaz
Urban Renaissance, WALL ST.J., May 15, 2006, at A14.
Extreme urban housing prices are.., in large part the product of political constraints. As
Harvard's Ed Glaeser has pointed out, regulatory restraints, neighborhood "nimbyism" and
.smart growth" policies have played a large role in driving up housing prices by restraining
supply, particularly outside favored downtown districts where, after all, there are few
neighbors around to object to new construction.
Id. But Kotkin denies that upper-income residents are to be blamed for middle-class flight in more than
a handful of cities. Id.
98 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 102.
Executives in places like greater Boston or the San Francisco Bay area now complain they
cannot stafffirms locally since well-educated workers, particularly those in their 30s, can no
longer afford to buy houses in these traditional tech centers. Instead, they often opt to expand
further out, to areas where a middle-class lifestyle is still within reach. This also explains the
movement of professional service companies, for example, from San Francisco to Las Vegas,
where not just the slots are ringing. Professional business service employment in that desert
city has risen by a remarkable 30% since 2002.
Kotkin, supra note 97.
9 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90 at 103-04.
too Id. at 104.
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other Americans' human right to property so that the working class is held
at bay (i.e., kept out of desirable locales).''
Indeed, if the unwanted plebeians once have purchased a foothold, why
don't patricians just unmuzzle snarling police to expel the hoi polloi? The
high and the mighty do. In the wake of Kelo v. New London,'02 it is but
seldom that eminent domain abuse victimizes the wealthy. Instead,
developers and cities, typically, work hand in hand to take the holdings of
the poorer, or of the middle-income folk. Developers can be awarded
modest beachfront bungalows, to erect million dollar-plus condominiums.
How have these interventions impinged upon African-Americans?
1o Id. at 105-06. Wimess the ongoing struggle over zoning in posh Collier County, Florida.
Noelle Knox, Wealth Gap Swallows Up American Dream, USA TODAY, November 24,2006, B1.
"When legal protections are broken, and property rights are abandoned, the poorest members
of society are vulnerable to immense exploitation, and the creation of new wealth is impeded by the lack
of civil stability." Glen Austin Sproviero, Book Note, Moral Visions of the Free Market, U. BOOKMAN, Fall
2006, at 36, 37, available at http.//www.kirkcenter.org/bookman/44-2-sproviero.htm. House prices in
Manhattan, California and Hawaii have been judged to resemble those in London, Dublin and
Barcelona:
Most of the price reflects the location rather than the accommodation. You cannot make more
houses on East 69th Street or in Belgravia. Nor can you make more houses at the most
prestigious addresses, because it is in the nature of prestigious addresses that there are not
many of them.
Well located houses are what the economist Fred Hirsch called a positional good.
House prices are consequently a product of sociology as well as economics. That combination
explains why it is Britain, Ireland and Spain, not France, Italy and Germany, that have seen
the fastest rises in European house prices and Hawaii, California and New York, not Idaho,
Mississippi and Nebraska, have been the hot spots in the US.
John Kay, Pay No Attention to Useless House Price Forecasts, FIN. TIMEs, November 7, 2006, at 15. Indeed,
you cannot make more homes in the most prestigious towns if local law forbids building houses and
apartments for the working class.
102 545 U.S. 469 (2005). "In the five years between 1998 and 2002, more than 10,000 properties
nationwide were threatened or condemned for private development through eminent domain; in just
the past year since Kelo, more than 5,700 properties have been similarly threatened or taken." Scott
Bullock, The Specter of Condemnation, WALL ST.J.,June 24,2006, atA1; cf. John Fee, Eminent Domain and
the Sanctity of the Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 783 (2006).
103 Scott Bullock, Letter to the Editor, We Must Undo Kelo Decision's Damage, WALL ST. J., Apr.
18, 2006, at A19. (Mr. Bullock is a senior attorney at the Institute forJustice, which represented the
homeowners in Kelo v. New London). Id.
Since the dot-com boom, many big city mayors-such as Baltimore's Martin O'Malley and
San Francisco's Gavin Newsome-have placed their faith on selling their cities primarily as
"hip and cool" for the "creative class." By luring talented singles, gays, artists and well-heeled
empty-nesters, they hoped, their cities would prosper even as hoi polloi exited for the bland
suburbs and exurbs. This explains the widespread enthusiasm among urban boosters for the
construction-often with city subsidy---of concert halls, museums, fancy restaurants and
boutique hotels.
Kotkin, supra note 97, at A14. (emphasis added).
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B. The White and the Black
Residence constitutes a crucial factor in the state of African-American
advancement. In Kelo, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the homeowners."°
Only last year, Black Enterprise proclaimed: "[Y] ou know that our mission is
to close the wealth gap between black and white households, and that
increasing rates of homeownership--the primary source of wealth for most
Americans-among African Americans is critical to achieving that
objective.""°5 Black Enterprise has proclaimed a ten point Declaration of
Financial Empowerment. In the Editors' emphatic reminder: "We revised
DOFE in January 2004 and made the No. 1 principle to use homeownership to
build wealth."' °6 Why?
Property rights deliver the option to convert physical assets into financial
assets.1 7 That option, in turn, facilitates the creation of further wealth
104 Douglas Schwartz, Letter to the Editor, We Must Undo Kelo Decision's Damage, WALL ST.J.,
Apr. 18, 2006, at A19.
105 Earl G. Graves, Sr., One Prize, But Hundreds of Winners, BLACKENTERPRISE, Mar. 2006, at 12.
"In the United States the dispossessed are largely black... "MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: MEN,
WOMEN, AND MORALS 403 (1985).
Across racial lines, homeownership is the greatest contributor to generatingwealth
in the United States. That's why BE launched its OwnYour First Home Contest last year. It's
also why "to use homeownership to build wealth" remains the No. 1 Principle of our
Declaration of Financial Empowerment, the centerpiece of the BE Black Wealth Initiative
(www.blackenterprise.com/wealth/wbk.asp). The benefits ofhomeownership are many, and
they extend beyond personal asset building. Homeowners tend to play more active roles in
their communities, they vote at higher rates, and they contribute to neighborhood stability
at higher rates than non-homeowners, according to public policy studies.
"Homeownership is transformative because people use their equity to pay for
education for themselves or their children," says Ken Wade, chief executive officer of
NeighborWorks America, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization that provides
financial and training assistance to improve communities. "A good number of small
businessmen get their start by tapping into the equity in their homes," he adds.
Tony Parrish, Achieve Your Dream of Homeownership, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 2006, at 110, 113.
106 Our Commitment to Wealth Building, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Mar. 2006, at 14 (emphasis in
original). See, e.g., Sheryl Nance Nash, Future Plans in Real Estate: Chris Butler Is Positioning His Finances
to Become a Property Owner, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 2006, at 88.
On the other hand, a secular rise in housing prices creates no wealth: "Unless a homeowner
decided to move to Antarctica or into a smaller house, the new wealth did not increase their house
buying power." Vitaliy Katsenelson, How Mental Accounts and Oil Prices Can Hit Spending, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 23/24, 2006, at W5. Instead, rising housing prices increase property taxes (as a home is appraised
at a greater value), and increase housing sale transaction costs (as agents collect a percentage of the price).
Id.
107 Sowell, supra note 93, at 200.
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(whether in combination with others, or individually).' Many Americans
have built their own businesses-some of which evolved into titanic
corporations-by borrowing money for the launches thereof£' 9 They
obtained the requisite initial capital through borrowing, while putting up
homes, farms, or other real estate as collateral."' But not everyone could.
In the post-open housing law"' context of 1972, U.S. Representative
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., offered:
In housing, I can best present the problem by describing.. .actual
situations in my own home area, the San Francisco peninsula, one
of the highest-per-capita-income areas in the world, the home of
Stanford University, an area of unparalleled climate and beauty, the
community where some of the leading businessmen, lawyers, Nobel
Prize winners and scientists of Western civilization reside-but
where many people still refuse to sell or rent their homes in all-
white neighborhoods to black applicants.
Several years ago, the San Mateo City School District hired, in
the spring, ten black teachers to go to work the following
September. None did. Why? They couldn't find housing because of
the refusal of local apartment-house owners, realtors and home
owners to sell or rent to black people."'
108 Id. at 200-01. "Instead of using funds to make repairs and renovations that increase a
property's value, many homeowners use the equity in their homes to expand their real estate holdings.
And with interest rates still relatively low, such loans are even more appealing to investors." Carolyn M.
Brown, Real Deals: How to Use Equity to Build a Portfolio of Real Estate Assets, BLACK ENTERPRISE,
December 2006, at 43.
109 Sowell, supra note 93, at 198-99.
110 Id. at 199. For example, the provision to spouses ofjoint title for houses erected in Indian
squatter communities, Namita DattaJoint Titling-A Win-Win Policy?: Genderand Property Rights in Urban
Informal Settlements in Chandigarh, India, 12 FEMINISTEcON. 271,271-3 (2006), allows residents to utilize
their small houses for loan collateral "to set up an income-earning enterprise." Id. at 277. "Homeowner-
ship, a traditional measure of economic well-being, does more thanjust help families build equity. The
children of homeowners tend to perform better in school and have fewer behavioral problems. And
home equity is a major source of collateral for people seeking bank loans to start new businesses."
Editorial, Home Economics, WALL ST.J., May 26,2006, at A10.
III Fair HousingAct, Pub. L. No. 90-284,82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42. U.S.C.
S3601 et seq. (2006)).
112 PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY, JR., TRUTH AND UNTRUTH: POLITICAL DECEIT IN AMERICA 147
(1972). Mr. McCloskey remains alive and kicking: "In one of the year's most improbable races, the 78-
year-old former congressman hasjumped back into politics in a long-shot bid to oust House Resources
Committee Chairman Richard Pimbo." David Rogers, In California, a Fight for Republican Priorities-
MCoskey Seeks to Return to House and 'Give Them the Ben Franklin Treatment,' WALL ST.J., June 1, 2006,
at A4_
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But twenty-first century America practices more subtle exclusionary arts.
Most of the land in San Mateo County, California, lies-as "open
space"-legally off-limits to housing.'13 Although the total population of San
Mateo County expanded by approximately 50,000 persons between the 1990
and 2000 Censuses, the African-American population therein actually shrank
from over 35,000 to less than 25,000 people." 4 In the adjacent,"' likewise
affluent"16 San Francisco County, the African-American population withered
from above 79,000 during 1990 to below 61,000 in 2000.117 Meanwhile, the
population overall swelled by 50,000.18 Held at bay. Finds Dr. Thomas
Sowell of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in Palo Alto,
California: "All the while, people in such places speak of a need for
'diversity' and 'affordable housing'-neither of which they have or are likely
to get, as their populations become whiter and older with rising housing
prices. '
1 9
Consistent with, albeit distinct from, Gay's insight (that the impact of
neighborhood quality upon the obtrusiveness of race demarcates the
material kernel of black racial identity) is the finding of Shapiro: "The
residential color line is the key feature distinguishing African Americans
from all other groups in the United States."' 20 (Another sage submitted: the
problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline). The
decades since the passage (during the 1960s) of open housing legislation have
witnessed the phenomenon ofwhite flight from integrating communities.121
A driving force behind residential segregation is a combination of attitude
and actions."z
113 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 280; SOWELL, supra note 93, at 103.
114 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 280-1; SOWELL, supra note 93, at 108-9.
115 SOWELL, supra note 93, at 108.
116 BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 90, at 281.
117 SOWELL, supra note 93, at 108.
118 Id. "Census officials say that domestic migration tends to be one of the finest measures of the
impact ofsuch economic factors such as ... housing prices." Rafael Gerena-Morales & Michael Corkery,
Bursting Tech Bubble, Higher Housing Costs Send People Packing, WALL ST.J., Apr. 20, 2006, at B 1. Census
data comparing annual domestic net migration rates from the 2000-2004 span against comparable rates
from the 1990s finds that the rate of domestic migration out of the San Francisco Bay area nearly trebled
"to an annual net loss of 14.7 people per 1,000 population, vs. a rate of 5.5 people in the 1990s." Id.
119 SOWELL, supra note 93, at 109. Ofthe 200 largest American metropolitan areas, the four with
the highest living costs (measuring all household expenditures) are, in this order: San Francisco,
California; Santa Cruz, California; San Jose, California; and Santa Ana, California. 200 Largest Metro
Areas, FORBES, May 22, 2006, at 204. 204.
120 SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 141 (2004).
121 Id. at 122.
122 Id. at 124.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Specifically, a familiar element in the story of real estate in the United
States is the dynamic of a lowering of property values when African-
American families move in and white flight takes off. Homeowners demand
a steep compensation to settle in a neighborhood more than 10 percent
African-American.'l 3 It is only fair that families should worry over losing
value in their homes. But initially assuming that African-American
neighbors decrease property values, and the consequent behaving as if this
assumption were correct, trigger a self-fulfilling prophecy. 124 The premises
are: (a) the foremost sellers will collect the loftiest prices for their homes; so
(b) to wait is only to warrant that property values must go south. The upshot
is that moving out nourishes instability, exactly when a neighborhood needs
stability. Thus, residential segregation is prolonged.'1s But a federal affirma-
tive action in housing statute, providing for checkerboard neighborhoods via
restrictive covenants, would perpetuate integration. The stability inhering
therein would present a sound ground for the retention of homes by a white
market element hitherto leery of investing in housing locales presumptively
vulnerable to white flight. (In 2007, white neighborhoods in general are
presumptively vulnerable to white flight).
How did Americans reach this pass?
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICY: THE INSIGHTS OF
PROFESSOR IRA KATZNELSON
A. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal
Before 1880, most families in the United States owned their own
homes.' 26 It was at thatjuncture that public opinion began its repudiation of
economic laissez faire. That repudiation was marked by passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act during 1887.Y A steady decline in the home
123 Id. at 122.
124 Id. at 123.
125 Id. at 125.
126 JOHN HOOD, INVESTOR POLITICS: THE NEW FORCE THAT WILL TRANSFORM AMERICAN
BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 193 (2001).
127 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). The Sherman
Antitrust Act was passed three years later. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat.
209 (1890). These measures prefigure Progressivism:
The progressives were the self-conscious social and legal reformers who occupied center stage
in the period roughly from the onset of the 20th century through the election of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt as president in 1932.... Progressives believed in the power of science and
economics, employed by government, to lift up the economic and social position of the
general population.
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ownership rate moderated briefly in the 1920s.128 That decade witnessed the
initial (but not final) national housing bubble. 29 The Roaring Twenties
presented an interruption in the long-term slide from economic laissez
faire." 3° The homeownership rate plunged during the 1930s.
13 1
Then, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt elected to
utilize federal credit to increase employment in the construction trades
(which were unionized).32 By far the most popular of U.S. housing
strategies have been policies operating through mortgage credit terms and
availability.' 33 The Federal Home Loan Bank system inaugurated a series of
David Gordon, Planners in Black Robes, 12 MISES REV. 23, 24 (2006) (book review) (quoting RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 2-3 (2006)). Was the New Deal
necessary?
At the time the New Deal began, mutual assistance for insurance did not consist of a few
isolated workingmen's groups. Philanthropy of the poor did not consist of a few Lady
Bountifuls distributing food baskets. Broad networks, engaging people from the top to the
bottom of society, spontaneously formed by ordinary citizens, provided sophisticated and
effective social insurances and social services of every sort.
David Gordon, A Man, a Plan, a Flop, 12 MISES REV. 1, 2 (2006) (book review) (quoting CHARLES
MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE STATE 116-17 (2006)). The Interstate
Commerce Commission was abolished during 1996. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995). This was because its prominent functions were removed by deregulation
statutes, and its remaining functions were shifted elsewhere. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional
Preemption: Removal of State Regulatory Powers, 38 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 375, 375 (2005), available at
http'//www.apsanet.org/imgtest/375-378.pdf.
128 HOOD, supra note 126, at 125.
129 A. Gary Shilling, Implosion, FORBES,June 19,2006, at 168. The savvy recognition of a bubble
in housing is not as profitable to investors as one might guess. According to the Regents Professor
Emeritus of Economics at the Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University: "Certainly, the
housing market is hard to short." Donald Ratajczak, Is There a Housing Bubble?, J. OF FIN. SERVICE PROF.,
Jan. 2006, at 39, 42.
130 Indeed, seen from a longer historical perspective, it was the Harding-Coolidge epoch
that was the interruption of a long-term historical process. It had not been a universally
accepted American doctrine that "the business of the United States is business." All of the
early twentieth century was filled with protest and action against this view. But for a brief,
ecstatic period, the American people, all criticisms stilled by the euphoria of the boom, forgot
truths and passions and prejudices that, all the same, were merely sleeping.
DENIS W. BROGAN, THE ERA OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A CHRONICLE OF THE NEW DEAL AND
GLOBAL WAR 359 (1950).
131 HOOD, supra note 126, at 125.
132 Id. at 198.
133 NETZER, supra note 80, at 84. "African Americans are more likely to receive subprime
mortgage loans than Latinos and much more likely to receive them than whites." Cliff Hocker, Blacks
Saddled with High-Interest Loans, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 2006, at 48. The most recent discussion of
discrimination in credit and housing markets is Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and Housing
Markets: Findings and Challenges, in HANDBOOKON THEECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (William M.
Rodgers, Ill, ed., 2006).
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district banks to buy loans from private lenders to encourage mortgage
lending and new housing construction. The Home Owners Corporation
assisted families refinancing mortgages (rather than confront foreclosure).
It issued $8 billion in loans to a million U.S. families from 1933 to 1935.
Congress, during 1934, passed a Housing Act to create federal mortgage
insurance for the small home. The newborn Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) was to reimburse lenders upon default. 3 4 By 1940, 40 percent
of housing startups were covered by FFIA mortgage insurance. 135 (Housing
starts leaped from 332,000 in 1936 to 619,000 in 1941).136 In some instances,
by contrast with nowadays, 137 it became cheaper to purchase a home than to
rent. 138 (Examination of the premiums charged under FHA guidelines dis-
closes that-given those risks tied to FHA loans-the program underprices
mortgage insurance) .139 That Act likewise produced a Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, to rescue savings and loan companies
overextended in their mortgage undertakings."4
Another Housing Act, of 1937, further expanded loan guarantees. In
1938, Congress launched the Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae") to purchase and sell mortgage loans in the secondary
market.14 ' It is indisputable that Fannie Mae has achieved its original goal of
increasing the sums of money available for mortgages. Fannie Mae today is
the largest single source of funding for mortgages in America.142
134 HOOD, supra note 126, at 198.
135 Id. at 199.
136 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH 17 (1995).
137 "It is now much more expensive to pay the mortgage than to rent a comparable place, tax
considerations included." Morton B. Zuckerman, Did Someone Say Bubble?, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP.,
May 8, 2006, at 72. "Rents have risen because more people are renting now that it's more difficult to
afford a home."James C. Cooper, Inflation Backs the Fed Into a Corner, BUs. WK., July 3, 2006, at 29. "In
San Francisco or Honolulu, for example, annual ownership costs are 68 and 73 percent greater than
rental costs." Alison Beard, et al., To Buy or To Rent?, FIN. TIMES (London), July 15, 2006, at 1.
138 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 136, at 17.
139 Donald F. Cunningham & Patric H. Hendershott, Pricing FHA Mortgage Default Insurance, 3
HOUSING FIN. REV. 373 (1984).
140 HOOD, supra note 126, at 198-99.
141 Id. at 199. "For years, high-leveljobs at Fannie Mae were lucrative prizes for lawyers, bankers
and political operatives waiting for their next U.S. government post. Along with generous pay came the
company's feel-good mission of helping low-income people afford homes." James R. Hagerty, Fannie's
Next Fight Could Be Payback Time, WALL ST.J., June 8, 2006, at C1.
142 Byron York, Funny Business at Fannie Mae, NAT'L REV., June 19, 2006, at 22, 22.
Wall Street banks are the new housing-finance agencies, when it comes to buying
mortgage-backed securities.
Defying expectations that the flat yield curve would force them to sell their
holdings this year, banks have kept buying, easily supplanting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
as the main source of demand.
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The New Deal's'43 alphabet soup of housing credit agencies largely
survives.' 44 The homeownership rate rocketed from its historical nadir of 44
percent in 1940, to 63 percent by 1965."45 Tax breaks for homeowners in-
creased the demand for housing. In the 1970s and 1980s, Americans
accurately believed their homes to be their primary investment. 46 Until
legislation of the late 1970s and early 1980s shielded Individual Retirement
Accounts, and 401 (k) s, from taxation, the mortgage interest deduction prod-
ded many Americans to treat their homes as their sole retirement asset. 4
Homeownership had attracted what has been styled a "critical mass"'"
by the mid-1960s. That critical mass impacted upon the American political
economy. 49 Certainly, home values do impact local government taxation,
school financing, and land use policies.'S' American education, at the
secondary level, largely is financed through local property taxes. Therefore,
wealthy suburbanites can afford plush schools. This reverses earlier times
when the finest public schools were urban.'"
That has lefi mortgage-bond investors wondering whether the banks will also take
on another ofFannie and Freddie's roles: providing steady demand whenever turbulence hits
the mortgage market.
Neil Shah, Banks Scoop up Mortgage Bonds, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2006, at B5.
143 "As a result of the New Deal, state autonomy was very different in 1940 from what it had been
in 1920." CASS SUNSTEIN, FREEMARKETSAND SOCIALJUSTICE 351 (1997); see, e.g., G. EDWARDWHITE,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2002).
144 HOOD, supra note 126, at 200.
145 Id. at 199. By 2006, U.S. homeownership was at an all-time peak (of 69 percent). Home
Economics,supra note 110. "The minority homeownership rate of 52% [was] also unprecedented." Id. But
how can the voice of capitalism brag about even the prior datum?
Today more than three quarters of Costa Ricans own homes, and nearly every one of those
homes has a refrigerator, washing machine, and color television. Even in remote villages,
people have access to electricity, clean water, and public education. The literacy rate is 96
percent, and life expectancy is seventy-eight years-a year longer than in the United States.
Stephen Kinzer, The Trouble with Costa Rica, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 8, 2006, at 56 (book review).
146 JOHN H. MAKIN & NORMANJ. ORNSTEIN, DEBT AND TAXES 299 (1994).
147 HOOD, supra note 126, at 200.
148 Id. at 201.
149 Id.
And housing is much more important to most Americans than the stock market is. Half of
Americans own stocks or mutual funds; 69% of households own their own abodes. And
homeownership is much more evenly spread. The top 10% of the income pile owns 24 times
as much in stocks as the bottom 20% but only 6.4 times as much in residence value. So the
average Joe is better off now, even though stocks remain below their early 2000 peak.
A. Gary Shilling, The Cupboard Is Bare, FORBES, Oct. 2, 2006, at 110.
150 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEOWNER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2005).
151 Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Rich Man, Poor Man, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP.,June 12,2006, at
72,71.
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Upon the 1945 close of World War II, approximately 50 percent of the
revenue collected by states and localities derived from taxes on property. By
1965, that share had slumped to 45 percent. Yet by 1980, it further had
dropped to 30 percent. (There it remains).5 2 As a proportion of personal
income taken in property taxes, the burden grew by 29 percent from 1950
to 1956.1 3 Between 1965 and 1980 it shriveled by nearly as much."s
According to the economic theory of democracy, homeowners voted to
insulate themselves from taxes: "Every economic theory of government
must assume that the governors carry out their social function primarily in
order to attain their private ends."' 5 (Since 1980, the proportion of personal
income taken in property taxes has risen at a modest rate).5 6
Bear in mind that "[t]raditionally, a considerable portion of American
citizens have been renters, before the 1930s a much higher percentage than
now."15 7 Washington artificially had engineered a social evolution unlikely
to have been spawned by free market forces.158 But what need justifies any
federal housing policy? For housing is a private asset. Its use is priced with
facility. 59 Mortgages are bundled for sale to investors as mortgage-backed
securities. 16° The Chicago Mercantile Exchange last year launched futures
and options tied to changes in the price of residential real estate.' 6' The
152 HOOD, supra note 126, at 201.
153 Id. at 201-02.
154 Id. at 202.
155 ANTHoNYDowNS, AN ECONOMIC THEoRYoF DEMocRAcY291 (1957). But an exception
to this axiom is claimed by Kenneth Arrow of Stanford University, winner of the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 1972. Arrow was interrogated (in relevant part):
There was a study done recently by an economist at Santa Clara University, Daniel Klein,
showing disproportionate numbers of registered Democrats versus registered Republicans
in various departments at the University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford. [The study's
findings are available at http'//www.ratio.se/pdf/wp/dk aw voter.pdf] He has concluded that
this kind of ideological imbalance has a negative impact on the education of students. He
implies that there is a temptation to hire one's own.
Nobel Prizewinner Kenneth Arrow on Economic Thought and Academic Freedom, ACADEME, May-June 2006,
at 45, 47. Arrow retorted (in relevant part), "In this case, the criticism seems to be just wrong, because
I think the departments hire on the basis of merit. And I think it's nonsense to say that we're
discriminating against Republicans." Id. "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye,
but.., not the beam that is in thine own eye?" Luke 6:41 (KingJames); Matthew 7:3 (KingJames).
156 HOOD, supra note 126, at 202 (citing "Computed by author using data from Moody, various
tables.").
157 GORDON TULLOCK, Education and Medicine, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OFWEALTH
REDISTRIBUTION 294, 298 (2005).
158 HOOD, supra note 126, at 200.
1s9 Id. at 216.
160 York, supra note 142, at 22.
161 Doug Cameron & Christopher Swann, US Housing Futures Market Launched, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 23, 2006, at 6.
2006]
158 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:133
construction thereof is readily financed through the private capital
markets.' 62
The great migration of blacks to northern cities began duringWorld War
.163 Approximately 2 million blacks moved north between the two World
Wars." 64 In the trailblazing national public opinion poll of racial attitudes,
during 1939,165 just 12 percent even of middle-western whites held that
African-Americans "should be able to live wherever they want to live, and
there should be no laws or social pressure to keep them from it."" 6 Possibly
the most potent promoter of residential segregation67--even during the era
of racial violence, restrictive covenants, and blockbusting 1 -- was federal
lending policy.' 69 (Of course, even an extremely low interest policy cannot
lift persons on the very bottommost income level.170 What color were they?)
Entire central city areas were, typically, redlined. This signified that loans
therein would not be advanced at all.171 Pronounce expert analysts Susan
Economists were provided with a new tool to assess -the cooling US housing
market yesterday with the launch by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange of futures and options
tied to changes in residential real-estate prices.
The prolonged boom in house prices, alongside the rise of more complex
mortgage products, has raised concerns about the severity of an emerging slowdown and its
impact on consumer spending.
Id.
62 HOOD, supra note 126, at 216.
163 SUSANWELCH ETAL., RACEAND PLACE: RACE RELATIONS INANAMERICAN CiTY22 (2001).
164 Id.
165 THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 60. This poll was reported thanks to Fortune
magazine. Id.
In 1935 market research techniques were applied to politics and public issues. Fortune was the
first to publish widely the results of such surveys (conducted under the direction of Elmo
Roper and others), and then George Gallup offered his features on a regular syndicated basis
to numerous newspapers. Beginning in 1936 "what the polls say" during national campaigns
became on of the most interesting and widely featured pieces of news.
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 235-36 (1962).
166 THERNSTROM & TERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 60 (citing Eugene L. Horowitz, 'Race'
Attitudes, in CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 204 (Otto Klineberg ed., 1944)).
167 WELCH, ET AL., supra note 163, at 23.
16 Id. at 22-23.
169 Id. at 23.
To a large extent existing residential patterns are the outcomes of millions of
individual housing decisions, but free choice is not the only force operative in the housing
market. The government, though its building and loan programs, has also participated in the
establishment of segregated neighborhoods, and thus, must bear a significant responsibility
for the defato school segregation that results from neighborhoods isolated by race and class.
BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTYAND DISCRIMINATION 287 (1995).
170 NETZER, supra note 80, at 90.
171 WELCH ET AL., supra note 163, at 23.
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Welch, Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe and Michael Combs: "Thus, the
federal government sanctioned overt racial discrimination." 172 Is it any
wonder that in the presidential election of 1940, a clear majority of African-
Americans nationwide might have preferred Republican candidate Wendell
L. Wilkie over President Roosevelt?173
B. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's GI Bill of Rights
In 2005, Ira Katznelson was the author of the well-received, 174 When
Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History ofRacial Inequality in Twentieth-
Century America.175 Katznelson explained that no other New Deal initiative
so profoundly changed the United States 176 as did the Selective Service
Readjustment Act' 7 (the "GI Bill"). 78 Between 1944 and 1971, federal
spending thereunder for former soldiers exceeded $95 billion. 79 In 1948, 15
percent of the federal budget was allocated to the GI Bill; meanwhile, 17
percent of the federal workforce served with the Veterans Administration.
180
172 Id. "During the foundational period of the 1930s and 1940s, these federally backed
instruments [including Fannie Mac and the FHA], especially those created by the GI Bill for veterans,
used redlining, local control, and overt discrimination to make it very difficult, often impossible, for
blacks to qualify for mortgages." IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN
UNTOLD STORYOF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURYAMERICA 163 (2005).
173 DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 156-157 n. 118 (2001)
(citingJamesJ. Kenneally, Black Republicans During the New Deal: The Role ofJoseph W, Martin,Jr., 55 REV.
POL. 117, 120 (1993)).
174 In the reckoning of Stanford University's Edgar G. Robinson Professor of U.S. History
Emeritus George M. Fredrickson: "Ira Katznelson has made a major contribution to the affirmative
action debate in his book "hen Affirmative Action Was White." George M. Fredrickson, Still Separate and
Unequal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 17,2005, at 32,33 (book review). Katznelson is the Ruggles Professor
of Political Science and History at Columbia University.
175 KATZNELSON, supra note 172.
176 Id. at 112.
It is often forgotten that military service brought huge advantages for previous generations
ofAmerican soldiers; for none more than those who benefited from the Bill of Rights passed
by Congress in 1944. This measure was designed to avert the threat of a return to 1930s mass
unemployment by easing soldiers' re-entry into the labour market with educational grants,
start-up business loans and house mortgages; but, when the post-war consumer boom
enabled America largely to avoid another slump and to provide jobs for the veterans, the Bill
became instead a piece of social engineering which, in effect, transformed access to higher
education and created a new middle class.
Ben Shephard, The Wrong Power, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT,June 30, 2006, at 10, 10 (book review).
177 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (1944).
178 KATZNELSON, supra note 172, at 112.
179 Id.
ISO Id.
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Upon his execution of this bill into law, President Roosevelt assured
Americans: "It makes provision for the guarantee by the federal government
of not to exceed 50 percent of certain loans made to veterans for the
purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business properties." 18' With
GI Bill assistance, millions purchased homes.1s2
Veterans Administration mortgages funded upwards of 5 million new
homes. 13 With GI Bill interest rates capped at modest levels, and down pay-
ments waived for loans of up to 30 years duration, the balance tilted sharply
from renting to purchasing.'14 In 1946 and 1947, Veterans Administration
mortgages accounted for over 40 percent of the total.185 That proportion is
striking given that youthful veterans were dramatically less likely to have
accumulated the funds to buy property than were those who had sat out
World War 11.186 Between 1945 and 1954, America added 13 million new
homes to the stock of housing. 8 7 In California, the federal government in
1936 had insured just six percent of home mortgages.'8s By 1950, it insured
half. 89
Unfortunately, federally-backed instruments created for veterans by the
GI Bill invoked redlining, local control, and express discrimination, to
impede or to preclude African-Americans from qualifying for mortgages)9°
The GI Bill mainly was crafted by the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on World War Legislation.' 9' It was chaired by John Rankin of
Mississippi. U.S. Representative Rankin was openly anti-Catholic, anti-
Jewish, and anti-African-American. 92 He quarterbacked the drafting of a
statute allotting implementation, primarily, to states and localities.' 93 The
mighty American Legion countenanced racial segregation, and (to garner
Southern backing in Congress) made clear its disinclination to challenge
Southern mores by enforcing equal treatment for all veterans. 94
181 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the GI. Bill of Rights (June 22, 1944), in THE
ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 309 (John Gabriel Hunt ed. 1996).
182 KATZNELSON, supra note 172, at 112.
183 Id. at 115.
184 Id. at 115-16.
185 Id. at 116.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 163.
191 Id. at 122-23.
192 Id. at 123.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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Discovers Katznelson: "The alliance of the Rankin-led South, the VA,
and the Legion produced a bill combining generosity to veterans with
provisions for the dispersion of administrative responsibilities that were
designed to shield Jim Crow." 9' Again: "The GI Bill's remarkable bounty
thus could be directed to the country's poorest region while keeping its
system of racial power intact." 196 Once more: "[T ] he approach Rankin took
combined complete federal funding with state and local control over the
auspices of the Veterans Administration. It also empowered private
institutions, including banks and colleges, to offer services only to veterans
they would choose to assist or admit."' 97 No wonder is it that economist
Sowell offers: "Historically, government itself has been a major promoter of
residential segregation."
198
Katznelson discerns:
[T]he results that can be traced directly to public policy here
were profound and long-lasting. Missed chances at homeownership
obviously compounded over time. Renters accumulate no equity,
while homeowners almost always secure financial gains that exceed
inflation.
The consequences proved profound. By 1984, when GI Bill
mortgages had mainly matured, the median white household had a
net worth of $39,135; the comparable figure for black households
was only $3,397, or just 9 percent of white holdings. Most of this
difference was accounted for by the absence of homeownership.
Nearly seven in ten whites owned homes worth an average of
$52,000. By comparison, only four in ten blacks were homeowners,
and their houses had an average value of less than $30,000. African
Americans who were not homeowners possessed virtually no wealth
at all.
Over time, it is much harder to make up gaps in wealth than in
income. 199
A political economy of incrementalism had fed de facto housing
segregation. So, what is incrementalism?
19 Id. at 124.
196 Id. at 125.
197 Id. at 126.
198 THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES 116 (1981).
199 KATZNELSON, supra note 172, at 163-64 (footnote omitted).
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VI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCREMENTALISM: CAN IT APPLY
TO REMEDYING DE FACTO HOUSING SEGREGATION?
The incremental mode of decision-making opens by identifuing the
problem for resolution.2° (This starting point distinguishes incrementalism
from the rational-comprehensive method. 1 That latter rational ideal, in its
pure form, opens with defining the mix of positive values to be attained:
what economists style a social welfare function).2'2 The incremental process,
typically, is remedial. Witness the New Deal's alphabet soup of housing
credit agencies. It aims at the alleviation of specific problems (e.g., today, de
facto housing segregation) rather than upon the pursuant of abstract ideals
(e.g., today, a colorblind citizenry).' Problems are presented to the govern-
ment by affected publics (e.g., by the victims of defacto residential segrega-
tion). They are not elicited from abstract analysis of the social environ-
ment.2' Temporal and informational constraints restrict policymakers'
attention to those options most likely to be adoptable. Practically, these
constraints confine policymakers' focus to incremental alternatives diverging
from existing policies but marginally.205
Incrementalism can be understood as a kind of political market. 26
Economic markets are greatly decentralized machines, wherein innumerable
bargainers strike the bestdeals available. 0 7 If certain underlying assumptions
are met (e.g., perfect information, perfect competition, etc.) the sum of
countless individual transactions means an efficient result to the public's
interest, an outcome superior to central planning. Insofar as centrally-
directed rationality is unattainable in the political marketplace, too, a highly
decentralized political bargaining process among self-interested individuals
likewise wins outcomes preferable to those consequent to comprehensive
centralization. 208 Incrementalism marks a political analogue to the self-
correcting, efficient market.
2 9
200 MICHAEL T. HAYES, INCREMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1992).
201 See id. at 16.
W Id. at 17.
203 id.
W4 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 22.
207 Id. at 23.
20a Id.
W9 Id. (citing CHARLEsE. LINDBLOM, THEINTELLIGENCEOFDEMOCRACY(1965)). The political
effect of the market was much written about by Yale's Charles E. Lindblom. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
A PROPENSITYTO SELF-SUBVERSION 218 (1995). Lindblom typified the post-liberal tradition. Ian Bell,
Book Review, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 580,581 (2006).
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The framers of the American constitutional system built-in a bias against
substantial policy innovations. 210 For example, Congress essentially is
211 tho
reactive. On the other hand, the system in place in 2007 does afford a
quantity of access-points.1 2 Reformers can start the process anywhere they
please.21 3 Research reveals the difficulty for proposals, in the American
system, to win agenda status. 214 It is insufficient that a problem be serious as
evidenced, as is defacto housing segregation, by a variety of statistical indica-
tors.215 Political and bureaucratic machineries are naturally most responsive
to those more organized, more prestigious, and better-funded interests.216
Luckily, an aroused public opinion can catapult an issue onto many
institutions' agendas.217 Those special interests can be quelled by an electoral
majority once it becomes clear to the electorate that injustice is being
worked by such interests.218 Empirical research teaches that an issue has a
greatly-enhanced chance of reaching agenda-level if, when public concern
attracts attention to a problem, a plainly perceived and readily grasped
solution already lies at hand.2 9 A challenge which few comprehend how to
meet (e.g., global warming) probably will fade from the agenda before
securing a governmental response.22° Voter mobilization approaches
impossibility regarding difficulties summoning professional expertise."
Contrariwise, when a problem (like defacto residential segregation) entails
a readymade solution (like, imaginably, affirmative action in housing)
amelioration is far more likely.
t
n
But would affirmative action in housingjust be social engineering along
the lines of Washington's manipulation of homeownership since the New
Deal? No. Comprehended accurately, social engineering is not, simply, the
210 HAYES, supra note 200 at 31.
211 In the words of the well-known constitutionalist, David Cole of Georgetown University Law
Center, see, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Congressional Social Poliymaking: United
States v. Eichman and Texas v. Johnson, 19 N.C. CENTRAL LAWJ., 146, 161 (1991), there is a problem:
"the reality is that nothing substantial happens in Congress unless actual events and political pressures
create a need for action." David Cole, In Case of Emergency, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 40, 43.
212 See HAYES, supra note 200, at31 (citing DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
507-08 (1951)).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 32.
215 Id.
216 THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS 198 (1975).
217 HAYES, supra note 200, at 32.
218 SOWELL, supra note 216, at 198.
219 HAYES, supra note 200, at 32.
22 Id. at 32-33.
221 SOWELL, supra note 216, at 198.
m HAYES, supra note 200, at 33.
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process oftheperse institutionalization of radical change. What matters is the
type of reform. The imposition of wage-price controls marks an example of
social engineering, through its interference with the spontaneous balancing
effectuated by a free play of supply and demand. It must be absurd to assert,
rather, that unshackling wages and prices also constitutes social engineering
(even should it engender temporary economic dislocations). m
Diversity in America is about keeping government at a safe distance. 24
The mixed economy is authoritarian. A step towards a freer market is
libertarian. Legalizing affirmative action in housing would expand
Americans' liberty. It less would mimic wage-price controls, than mimic the
repeal thereof. Likewise, tax credits are libertarian: being pro-choice, they
expand the zone of liberty. Legalizing affirmative action in housing (adding
a tax credit incentive) would supplement the post-1968 one-size-only
permission for a colorblind housing market, with the fresh option of
erecting the new checkerboard neighborhood. For is not the law and
economics movement fancied a type of legal behaviorism,2 aiming to fine
tune the free market?22
6
22 Bret Stephens, Book Review, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11-13, 2006, at D10. "While change can
certainly be destabilizing, there is a difference between changing in order to move away from tradition
and changing in order to return to it." Michael P. Foley, The Language of Prayer, WALL ST.J., June 23,
2006, at Wl1.
224 See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE (2006).
223 According to George Washington U. Law School of Prof. David Fontana:
[T]he American law school, like the rest of the university, has been influenced, starting in the
1950s, by the behavioral revolution in the social sciences and the way it placed a priority on
survey research, econometrics, and rational-choice theories. The work that came out of that
revolution led to a variety of new scholarship that reflected more "universalist" perspectives,
which were based on scientific methods that behavioralists believed applied to all questions
social scientists wanted to answer.
The behavioral revolution has also changed the academic life of the law schools.
Many law professors now have secondary degrees, and a large number of those secondary
degrees are in fields particularly influenced by behavioral science, like economics or political
economy.
David Fontana, American Law Schools, Meet the World, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 26,
2006, at B10. Social policy programs are advanced as responses to market societies' problems. See, e.g.,
PETER G. ROSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL POLICY (2005). Affirmative action constitutes a social
experiment. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (HarveyJ. Holzer & David Neumark
eds., 2004).
226 See ELEANOR KERLOW, POISONED Iw: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER POLITICS
ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 144 (1994).
As long as one's theory is predictively useful within one's field, why inquire about the limits
of this usefulness or about possibilities of research which are eclipsed or occluded by the very
success of that research? Or why inquire about the theorizer? Why inquire about his or her
choice of method and subject matter, and what this choice presupposes and precludes?
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SVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HOUSING
A. The Checkerboard Community
Broadening the freedom of Americans by legalizing racially restrictive
covenanted-affirmative action in housing must be a Congressional initiative.
The Fair Housing Act, a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 19 6 8,2 bars
discrimination premised upon race, color, sex, religion, or national origin in
housing financing, sale, or rental.' 8 Congress is a reactive, not proactive,
creature. But is there evidence in America, quantitatively,m for any
sustained appetite for a racially-stabilized residential integration?
Yes. As long-since reported in the legal literature, this taste for integrated
housing was manifest in survey data of exactly (1976-1978) three decades
past. Then, interracial reconciliation demonstrably was less nearly mature
than it is in 2007. A December 1, 1977-January 10, 1978, Louis Harris and
Associates national survey in collaboration with the U.S. Department of
History and Urban Development Policy Studies Division disclosed that the
"Racial Composition of Preferred Neighborhood" proved "Half White-
Half Minority" in the minds of 57.2 percent of African-Americans. 2 ° The
1976 Detroit Area Survey of the University of Michigan interviewed parties
from sample households in the tri-county Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area of Detroit. Twelve percent of African-Americans chose an ethnically
pure African-American neighborhood as their primary preference. Sixty-
three percent opted for a half- African-American half-white neighborhood
as their first choice. (Another twelve percent of Detroit's African-Americans
picked this as their number two choice),23' Thus, 57 to 75 percent of
African-Americans welcomed the prospect of a 50-50 racially integrated
neighborhood. (Others desired a wholly monochrome option-an
alternative realistically in the cards in 2007, as in 1976).
BRUCE WILSHIRE, THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF THE UNIVERSITY: PROFESSIONALISM, PURITY, AND
ALIENATION 73 (1990).
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. S 3601 et seq.
(2006)).
228 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
n9 "When the 'exact' scientist can count or measure something, he experiences a pleasure which,
to the outsider, is hard to understand." KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION 16 (Marjorie Kerr Wilson
trans., 1966).
230 U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv. OFF. OF POL'VY DEv. & RES., THE 1978 HUD
SURVEY ON THE QUALITYOF COMMUNITY LIFE: A DATA BOOK 9, 298-99 (1978) noted in Swan, supra
note 34 at 29 n.289.
231 Reynolds Farley et al., Barriers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 97, 104 (1979), noted in Swan, supra note 34, at 29 nn.288-90.
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The 1977-1978 Louis Harris nationwide survey discovered that 15.5
percent of Euro-Americans styled a 50-50 racially integrated neighborhood
as their ideal. 2 Meanwhile, in 1976 Detroit, eleven percent of whites said
they would feel very comfortable, and another 15 percent said they would
feel somewhat comfortable, with a neighborhood composition of four
African-Americans per three (not four) whites. (Even respecting a three-
quarters African-American neighborhoodjust 84 percent of whites admitted
themselves unwilling to move into such a locale),233 Thus, 15 to 26 percent
of Detroit's Euro-Americans avowedly could settle into a 50-50 racially
integrated neighborhood.
There being so many more whites than blacks in the United States'
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas as defined by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, this smaller proportion of whites (than blacks) with a
propensity to integrate sufficed numerically to match up with their black
counterparts in 50-50 racially checkerboard neighborhoods.734 So why don't
they? Recall the imperative of white flight before integrating black new-
comers. In 2007, it remains illegal for neighbors to covenant a 50-50 racially-
stable, integrated neighborhood. Yet even if Congress were to legalize
racially covenanting a checkerboard neighborhood, how might Congress get
a wary public to start the housing affirmative action ball rolling?
B. Section 42 Tax Credits
1. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Under the Fair Housing Act,23s low-income housing tax credit 6
properties are rented out to the benefit of low-income tenants. Low Income
Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) were instituted in the Tax Reform Act of
1986. 7 (These credits commonly are denominated Section 42 tax credits
from the applicable section of the Internal Revenue Code).3 8 That
enactment wiped away most other tax incentives to stimulate equity
investment in real estate (including low-income housing),." Creative
232 U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv. OFF. OF POL'Y DEV. & RES., supra note 230, at
299, noted in Swan, supra note 34, at 30 n.294.
W Farley et al., supra note 231, at 105, 335, noted in Swan, supra note 34, at 30 nn.292-294.
2U Swan, supra note 34, at 30-3 1.
235 42 U.S.C. S 3601 et. seq. (2006).
2 26 U.S.C. S 38 (a)(2) and (b) (5) (2006).
237 26 U.S.C. §42 (2006).
238 Id.
239 Michael A. Stegman, The Excessive Costs of Creative Finance: Growing Inefwciencies in the Production
of Low-Income Housing, 2 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 357,359 (1991).
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financing already had gained notoriety during the 1970s in California.240
Then, soaring housing prices had spun local markets out of control.24' The
demand for mortgage funding exceeded the willingness of conventional
suppliers to extend adequate credit at affordable terms to satisfy demand.242
LIHTC Projects present housing developers an avenue to capital by
allowing tax credits to for-profit investors committing capital to the
development of affordable residential projects. The tax credit is awarded to
a project not in any lump sum, but claimed by the for-profit investor/owner
over a decade-long span.243 In return, the project must set aside a fraction of
its units to low income households,2" for a 15 year minimum.245 Projects for
new construction (not federally subsidized) receive a maximum tax credit-
allocation having a present value of 70 percent2" (some 9 percent per
annum) 247 of the project's qualified basis. 24s In a project with federal
assistance, the top tax credit allocation has a present value of 30 percent 4
9
(some 4 percent per annum)' s of the project's qualified basis. (Whether a
building is federally subsidized is a matter of statutory definition).251
A qualified low-income housing project is one for residential rental
property25 2 wherein either (a) a minimum of 20 percent of the residential
units must be both rent-restricted 25 3 and occupied by residents whose
income is 50 percent (or less) of the area's median gross income ("20-50
Test") ;24 or (b) a minimum of 40 percent of the residential units must be
both rent-restricted and occupied by residents whose income is 60 percent
(or less) of this area's median gross income ("40-60 Test"). 25
The program is administered at the state level, 6 with each state reaping
a division of credits corresponding to its population.2 7 Section 42 tax credits
240 Id. at 357.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 26 U.S.C. § 42(0(2006).
244 S 42(g).
245 §42(i)(1).
246 S 42(b)(2)(B)(i).
247 542(b)(1)(A).
248 s 42(d).
249 S 42(b)(2)(B)(ii).
2Ws 42(b)(I)(B).
251 §42(i)(2).
252 54 2 (g)(1).
Bs3 42(g)(2)(A).
254 § 42(g)(1)(A).
255 §42(g)(1)(B).
256 §42(h)(3).
257 S 42(h)(3)(C).
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are allocated only if a building is subjected to an extended low-income
housing commitment between the taxpayer and her housing credit agency.
218
It must bind all successors of the taxpayer, 9 and must, with respect to the
property, be recorded as a restrictive covenant pursuant to state law.260 The
vast majority of residential subdivisions nowadays carry restrictive covenants
applicable to every property within the subdivision.261 If there exists an
overall plan whereby restrictions are laid upon every lot in the subdivision
to the mutual benefit of every parcel composing that subdivision, then each
purchaser ofa lot within the subdivision may enforce such restriction against
any other lot owner therein.26
While the "compliance period" for any building is 15 years, 2 housing
units supported by low-income tax credits are supposed to continue in low-
income use for up to 30 years, with an "extended use period" of 15 years
after the close of the compliance period. 6 Owners desiring to sell or to
convert their tax credit project after 15 years obtain termination of their
extended use period if the state credit agency cannot find a buyer to maintain
the low-income housing project for the remainder of the 30 year interval.265
(Termination of the extended use period also obtains upon foreclosure,
unless foreclosure is a taxpayer ploy to end the extended use period).26
The sale of tax credits to an investor is styled syndication. Developers
typically enter-into limited partnerships, whereby the income and tax credits
pass through to the partners as taxable income. The developer seeks limited
investors to deliver initial capital in return for the lion's share of annual tax
credits. (The developer serves as the general/managing partner).267 Investor
capital contributions might be rendered through construction, or over a
number of years.
Ruefully, it was explained during the 1980s that the tax credit alone
could elicit new, conventionally financed low-income housing at a rental of
approximately $491 monthly for a two-bedroom apartment.26' Assuming a
30 percent rent-income ratio, to meet a $491 gross rental a household would
2M S 42(h)(6)(A).
M 5 42(h)(6)(B)(v).
20 S 42(h)(6)(S)(vi).
261 HETRICK & OUTLAw, supra note 75, at 219.
2 Id. at 221.
r. 26 U.S.C. S 42(i)(1) (2006).
26 S 42(h)(6)(D)(ii)(II).
2 S 42(h)(6)(E)(i)(II).
2 S 42(h)(6)(E)(i)(I).
267 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low-
Income HousingTaxCredit.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
2'8 STEGMAN, supra note 239, at 360; see aLso JOSEPH GUGGENHEIM, TAX CREDITS FOR LOW-
INcOME HOUSING 69 (1989).
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need a $19,640 income. 69 Such an income was 30 percent above the 1986
median income of all American renters.27 'When the solitary source of
subsidy is the tax credit, so-called low-income housing can be constructed
in suburban fringe areas where incomes are flusher and costs are less
onerous-not where needs are greatest. It is the households with poverty-
level incomes that suffer the much deeper housing deprivation than do those
aided by otherwise unsubsidized tax credit projects. The law permitted
equity investors to access tax credit breaks by developing housing for
families with incomes as elevated as 60 percent of the median, when only 19
percent of all current residents of federally-assisted housing enjoyed incomes
even 50 percent of the median.27' Such statistics evoked the fulmination:
"Surely this is not the income group that Congress intended to target."
272
2. THE KEEN WISDOM OF PROFESSOR GORDON TULLOCK
Why in the world not? Professor Gordon Tullock is a distinguished co-
founder of the subdiscipline of law and economics.27 1 Professor Tullock of
the George Mason University School of Law 274 is widely supposed, in law
and economics circles, to be in the running for the Nobel Prize in
Economics.27s Ponder, in the context of low-income housing developments,
Tullock's ripe advice:
There is a rough rule of thumb by which we can detect which
projects are designed to help the poor and which are not designed
to help them. This rule of thumb is that if there is a means test, i.e.,
if the aid is so arranged that it cuts off at a reasonably low level, then
it is designed to help the poor. If there is no such test, then it is not
designed to help the poor, although it may, in fact, do so to some
269 STEGMAN, supra note 239, at 360.
2M Id.
27t Id. at 360. See also James E. Wallace, 1o Benefits From Preservation: The People Behind the
Numbers, 2 HOuSING POLICY DEBATE 219 (1991).
272 STEGMAN, supra note 239, at 360.
273 See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCic, LAW AND ECONOMICS (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005) (The
Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, vol. 9). "Yet the main task of political economy remains to provide
a better understanding of the ongoing interactions between politics and economics." HIRSCHMAN, supra
note 209, at 227 (emphasis in original).
274 See JohnJ. Miller, A Law School With a Twist, NAT'L REV., Mar,13, 2006, at 31, 32. "George
Mason has been hiring top professors and researchers and expanding its campus for several years." Stefan
Fatsis, Educational Slam Dunk? --- Upstart George Mason Hopes to Turn Hoops Success Into More Students,
Money, WALL ST.J., Mar. 30, 2006, at B1.
275 MILLER, supra note 274, at 32.
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extent. This rule of thumb is undeniably rough, but it seems to fit
the world fairly well. 76
Is the LIHTC cutoff at a reasonably low level?
Virtually at all times and places where income distribution has been
examined, there have been found more persons of below-average incomes
than of above-average incomes. This is reflected in a skewed income
distribution. A few extraordinarily rich people accompany a cluster of
ordinary folk with incomes somewhat beneath the mean. Every electorate
displays a majority with incomes somewhat below the mean.2" But in a
democracy, a general problem of the poor is that the reasons people are inept
in the give-and-take of the marketplace also render them maladroit in the to-
and-fro of the political forum.
To paint with a broad brush, what the poor extract from democracy
correlates not with their potential ballot-weight (which tends to be
dissipated) but with the upper-income electorate's basically charitable
motives:
The transfer of funds from the wealthy, even though it is not
large-scale in absolute quantity, benefits mainly the middle class.
When the poor are given special privileges (and they are in all
societies), this reflects charity on the part of the middle class and
wealthy rather than their political power. In any event, if we look at
the actual history of the development of social security and other
universal programs in the United States, it is fairly obvious that
redistribution to the poor was not one of the major objectives. 9
276 General Welfare or Welfarefor the Poor Only, in Tullock, supra note 157, at 245. "New Deal social
welfare legislation created two tracks of programs-needs-based programs such as Aid for Dependent
Children, and 'universal' programs including Social Security." Nicholas J.G. Winter, Beyond Welfare:
Framing and the Racialization of ,hite Opinion on Social Security, 50 AM.J. POL. SCI. 400, 417 (2006). The
contrast of Social Security to other social welfare programs was explicit from the beginning, as President
Roosevelt made plain in 1935. Id. at 404. The upshot proves to be "that at least some of the so-called
universal programs in fact have become associated with whiteness, serving, perhaps, as a psychological
aspect of white privilege." Id. at 417.
rn DAN USHER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 288 (2003).
78 TULLOCK, supra note 157, at 254. So it is suggested that the class structure of the U.S. two-
party system renders one of these two parties drawn, disproportionately, from those people the more
successful among the populace. Such partisans prove to be those among the populace the more
extensively skilled for economic combat. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, BUILDING RED AMERICA: THE
NEW CONSERVATIVE COALITION AND THE DRIVE FOR PERMANENT POWER (2006).
279 Id. at 255. The imperative behind the welfare state's special assistance to the middle (not
lower) class has been explained with arithmetical exactness. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 274-75 (1974). Political economy theorizes that the functions of universal suffrage are to
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Adds Tullock relevantly to the LIHTC:
It should be noted that insofar as the middle-class voters can
succeed in getting funds from the wealthy, there is no obvious
reason why they should pass them on to the poor. Thus, even if we
do have a scheme that raises the cost to the upper-middle groups,
there is no reason to believe that the poor rather than the lower
middle class will benefit.2s
The LIHTC is a mechanism not for the sustenance of the poor, but of the
lower middle-class.
3. THE CAVEAT
In all events, the lesson of Section 42 tax credits is that Congress does
gesture toward economic integration in neighborhood development. That
program creates options for renters. It does so by means of tax credits. This
device is a diminution, not expansion, of political power wielded over the
free market. (Section 42 tax credits conspicuously have benefited renters
who are more comfortably-off than are the truly needy).
Compare the notion of tax credits paving the way to racial integration,
likewise, within neighborhood developments. Such an evolution would,
likewise, open new options for homebuyers. Being an option running to
residential purchasers, it would, likewise, be fundamentally a market
phenomenon. Naturally, bids and asking prices for each unit in checker-
boarded condominiums, or for each checkerboard-squared residential lot,
would clasp at the market-clearing level. Homebuyers, as always, would be
plopping down their own money for their own homes. Black and white
next-door-neighbors would be making interdependent investments.
(Affirmative action in housing no more represents a welfare project than do
Section 42 tax credits comfort the imperiled poor-the welfare segment of
society-who need a safety net. Both are middle-class, or in any event,
working-class exercises). To the extent, at least, that Section 42 tax credits
have eased economic integration in housing, affirmative action in housing
tax credits too might do some good. A tool for stabilizing the aimed-for
integration is the restrictive covenant. Once it widely is seen that the sky
does not crash upon the checkerboard neighborhood, residential racial
integration in general could become spontaneous and self-perpetuating.
delegitimatize direct action, and to domesticate the proletariat. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING
INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC AcTION 112-119 (2002).
280 TULLOCK, supra note 157, at 259.
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Indeed, pro-diversity affirmative action in housing can compare
favorably with Section 42 tax credits. The Section 42 tax credits, in integrat-
ing a development financially, produce a locale of economically unequal
neighbors. (Is this not the whole idea?) These financially heterogeneous
neighbors are reminiscent of the colorful, miniature armies on a chessboard,
because on a chessboard the pawns and the various pieces command unequal
strengths.
Rather, affirmative action in housing would integrate condominiums or
subdivisions on racial diversity grounds alone. Adjacent homeowners
therein, like homeowners ordinarily, would greet one another as income
near-equals. Financial homogeneity marrying with racial diversity, racial
integration via affirmative action in housing might conceivably run more
smoothly than does the Low Income Housing Tax Credits system. Why?
Because the former creates a checkerboard in more way than one. Alternate
home sites keyed to different races manifestly would correspond to
alternately-colored checkerboard squares. But on each lot would reside a
homeowner with pockets equally as heavy as those of her neighbors. This
corresponds to the rank-equality in the realm of the checkers. (African-
Americans and Euro-Americans can share core values/aspirations) .28 Like
meets like. But the latter more resembles a chessboard. Atop the chessboard,
knights overshadow pawns.
On the other hand, it might be feared that developers of condominiums
and subdivisions cannot profitably entice adequate numbers of pioneer
buyers even into stable, racially covenanted checkerboard neighborhoods.
Developers might object that the hoped-for profits to be wooed from the
purchasers (at the market rate) of the black squares on the checkerboard will
not outweigh the market's dreaded discounting of prices for the white
squares-even assuming the sweetener of tax credits. Ambitious developers
might be horrified by the risk of writing offan integration-shy three-fourths
of the potential buyers of their white squares.
As a leading theorist of the subdiscipline of law and economics, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner,282 last
year insisted bluntly:
2at See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY (2001).
282 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003); IAN SHAPIRO,
THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (2005). Only last year Judge Posner was
recognized afresh as the "foremost exponent" of the Chicago school of law and economics. NICHOLAS
MERCURO AND STEPHEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 48 (2d ed. 2006). Judge Posner's latest book is RICHARD A. POSNER,
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).
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This is a commercial society. Having money is the surest path
to prestige in the United States, and the people who go into business
accept this social standard that money is the measure of your worth.
You can't expect them to be the first to sacrifice their commercial
opportunities in order to make a moral gesture.2t 3
Yet even the failure of affirmative action in housing would not
theoretically be a dead loss. In a libertarian society, giving people choices is
of value in itself, however seldom an option might be exercised. More
mundanely, the failure of affirmative action in housing would (at least)
present a sad experiment teaching Americans more clearly the social and
economic pressures protracting defacto residential segregation. Baldly put,
were affirmative action in housing to fail after 2007 to dissolve de facto
residential segregation (even as the 1968-2007 era of an officially colorblind
housing market has failed to eliminate defacto segregation), America would
be none the worse-off. Tax credits unclaimed cost nothing, and the field
would remain open for the thereby better-instructed next generation to
gamble on a third legal-and-economic strategy.
VIII. CAN NEIGHBORHOOD DIVERSIFICATION FIT THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PARADIGM?: THE INSIGHT OF
PROFESSOR EDWARD A. WYNNE
Affirmative action generally is identified with education,2M and with
employment.285 Must not an affirmative action push for diversity in
283 Katherine Mangan,AgentsofFortunes, CHRON. HIGHEREDUC. (Wash., D.C.),June 23,2006,
at A16. The context of Posner's remarks is the effectiveness of teaching ethics to business students. Id.
284 See, e.g., DAVID O. SACKS& PETERATHIEL, THE DIvERsITYMYrH: "MULTICULTURALISM"
AND THE POLITICS OF INTOLERANCEAT STANFORD (1998). According to Shelby Steele of the Hoover
Institution (Stanford University):
Europeans are utterly confounded by the swelling Muslim populations in their
midst. America has run from its own mounting immigration problem for decades, and even
today, after finally taking up the issue, our government seems entirely flummoxed. White
guilt is a vacuum of moral authority visited on the present by the shames of the past. In the
abstract it seems a slight thing, almost irrelevant, an unconvincing proposition. Yet a society
as enormously powerful as America lacks the authority to ask its most brilliant, wealthy and
superbly educated minority students to compete freely for college admission with poor whites
who lack all these things. Just can't do it.
Shelby Steele, White Guilt and the Western Past, Wall St. J., May 2, 2006, at A16. See also Shelby Steele,
White Guilt: How Blacks and Whites Together Destroyed the Promise of the Civil Rights Era (2006).
285 See, e.g.,Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Grutterat Work:A Title VII Critique ofConstitutionalAffirmative
Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408 (2006).
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residential neighborhoods be somehow at odds with these undertakings?
No. In fact, before the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Regents of University
of California v. Bakke,2 6 when persons spoke regarding educational
"diversity," they nearly invariably referred to America's variety of universities
and colleges. 27 The earliest unambiguous mention in the news media of the
educational merit attaching to "diversity" within the student body surfaced
only on November 23, 1977. It was on that date that the Washington Post
summoned attention to the thinking of Edward A. Wynne.288 Sociologist
Wynne in 1977 was the author of Growing Up Suburban.2
In a report entitled "Sociologist's Study Says That Suburbs Isolate
Children From Reality, Diversity,"m the Post's Bill Peterson related Wynne's
comprehension of the stunting of suburban children's emotional
maturing:
291
This leads, he says, to antisocial and self-destructive conduct,
including high suicide rates, drug use, delinquency and introverted
behavior. Sociologist Wynne lays the blame on many things that
have made suburban living attractive to two generations of
Americans: big lawns, shopping centers, safe streets and large,
modern schools.29
Somewhat ominously, Peterson recorded: "Children who grow up in
suburbs, he adds, 'are uniquely isolated from diversity,' outside stimulations
and most real-life situations, making it hard for them to adjust to later
life." 29
3
In Growing Up Suburban, Wynne relates that constructive affective
learning is fostered by diversity.294 Merely trifling learning will occur should
diversity be of so low an intensity that scant emotional demands are made
286 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
287 PETER WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 108 (2003). As President of
Educational Credential Evaluators, Inc., James S. Frey framed it just last year: "One of the greatest
attributes of our system of higher education is its heterogeneity." James S. Frey, Letter to the Editor,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 26,2006, at B17.
288 WOOD, supra note 287, at 109.
289 EDWARD A. WYNNE, GROWING UP SUBURBAN (1977).
2%o Bill Peterson, Sociologist's Study Says That Suburbs Isolate Children fom Reality, Diversity, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 1977, at A2.
291 WOOD, supra note 287, at 109.
M9' Peterson, supra note 290, at A2.
293 Id.
294 WYNNE, supra note 289, at 56.
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of learners.2 9 On the other hand, diversity must not menace the identity,
and the self-esteem, of those leamers.296 Here lie: (a) the Scylla of excessive
diversity so exciting participants to fear, or anger, such that they suspect or
flee the intrusive parties; and (b) the Charybdis of tokenism, whereunder
old ways endure, and the diversity is simply quaint.297 Should diversity
provoke excess stress within a powerful community, members may be
drawn by their commitment bond into intense resentment of the inescapable
alien.29 Thus, in enriching diversity, the legitimacy element (which fosters
a moderate promotion of diversity) is important.299
Since an infinite variety cannot be introduced into the learning
environment, what few types of diversity are called for?3°° Wynne looks to
the types of people with whom suburban adolescents probably will contact
between the ages of leaving community college (as to a university campus),
and launching of their careers (upon the completion of their post-graduate
or professional school):
Perhaps a useful rule is to first consider the kinds of adults and
children that contemporary suburban adolescents will probably
come in touch with when they are between the ages of (let us say)
20-35. What age cohorts and socioeconomic statuses will such
persons represent? They may include infants-the children of those
former adolescents; elderly people-the aged parents of former
adolescents; and very effective wealthy people and poor people-
their bosses and varied subordinates. Unquestionably, for most
adolescents in modern suburbs these persons represent a far greater
diversity than they will come close to in their schools or
communities.
301
Conspicuous by their absence from Wynne's list are racial, ethnic, or
linguistic minorities. Nonetheless, housing-affirmative action, to enhance
residential diversity, is no mere educational/employment affirmative action
copycat tactic. The cry for diversity among students arose from the pre-
Bakke critique of the artificial lack of residential diversity in suburbia. So,
what in 2007 is the affirmative action paradigm?
2% Id. at 57. The importance of the public schools in America's diverse society is a commonplace
observation. See, e.g., DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON GROUND (2004).
2- WYNNE, supra note 289, at 56.
2W Id. at 57.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 57-58.
3W Id. at 57.
301 Id.
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IX. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
A. What Is a Paradigm?: The Insights of Professor Thomas Kuhn
As explicated by the late Professor Thomas Kuhn,3" the careful
investigation of any given field at a specificjuncture reveals a set of recurring
and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories and their applications.
30 3
These comprise that community's paradigms, 304 disclosed in its lectures and
texts. In studying them and in practicing with them, the community
members absorb their profession. 30 1 Scientists can concur that a colleague
has defined a seemingly stable solution to a cluster of outstanding problems,
nevertheless disagreeing (perhaps unconsciously) about what features make
the solution enduring. That is, they can identify a paradigm without ever
attempting to rationalize it."°6 In fact, a paradigm need not imply any such
full rules-set exists. 3°
Research problems within a single scientific tradition do not share their
satisfaction of some explicit set of rules.308 Specialists proceed from models
acquired via education and their literature, often in ignorance of what
characteristics afford their models' community paradigm status. °9 Scientists
302 See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN (Thomas Nickles ed., 2003).
303 A paradigm does not impose a rigid or mechanical approach but can be taken more or
less creatively and flexibly. The concept was influential in supplanting the positivist
conception of science as an abstract, rationally and logically structured set of propositions.
Kuhn's view emphasizes its concrete historical situation in the space of problems and
approaches inherited from preceding achievements. A paradigm is only upset in periods of
revolutionary science, typically arising in response to an accumulation of anomalies and
stresses that cannot be resolved within its framework.
SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARYOF PHILOSOPHY 276 (1996).
304 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43 (3rd ed., 1996).
305 Id.
M6 KUHN, supra note 304, at 44. "We tend to view shifts in scientific paradigms merely as
advances in precision, which inevitably impose certain austerities on language and imagination. Newton
did not necessarily desire a purely mechanical physics, but we assume he was driven towards one by the
imperatives of empirical and mathematical truth." David Bentley Hart, A Good Push, TIMES LIT. SUPP.,
Mar. 24, 2006, at 31.
307 KUHN, supra note 304, at 44. See also MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 69-132
(1958).
308 KUHN, supra note 304, at 45.
M9 When well conceived, a model leaves no doubt about its assumptions. It lists the
important factors and offers educated guesses about their interaction. Within this self-
imposed framework, the investigator makes predictions about the real world, and the more
precise the prediction, the better. He thus puts the product of his thinking on the line by
exposing it to evidential proof or disproof There is nothing in science more provocative than
a cleanly defined and surprising prediction, and nothing held in higher regard than such a
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never learn laws in the abstract, but as encountered through application.3"'
As long as a paradigm remains secure, practitioners function sans consensus
over its rationalization. 31 * The standard paradigm underlying economic
model-building boasts roots reaching back to the work ofAlfred Marshall.312
In short, advances in scientific knowledge result from paradigm shifts.
Thereby, a prior way of looking on the world is, relatively rapidly, replaced
by another. A slow process of reappraisal is not the mode of replacement.313
Insofar as Kuhn's work depicts scientific development as the succession of
tradition-bound intervals punctuated by non-cumulative breaches, its theses,
doubtless, are of widespread applicability. 34 Unfortunately, the grand
problem is that American constitutional law contains absolutely no means
whereby to explain revolutions in constitutional interpretation. It cannot
account for whatjudges should be doing when they introduce revolutionary
changes in doctrine.315 In all events, the American juridical scientist's
paradigmatic method of analyzing affirmative action, today, dates from a
dramatic Supreme Court opinion of 2003.
prediction confirmed in detail.
EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITYOF KNOWLEDGE 198 (1998).
310 KUHN, supra note 304, at 46.
31t Id. at 48-49.
312 See, e.g., JOHN SUTTON, MARSHALL'S TENDENCIES: WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS KNOW?
(2002). "Alfred Marshall (b. 1842 - d. 1924) was a great English economist." George Steven Swan, The
Political Economy of the Interstate Commerce Clause: United States v. Lopez and United States v. Robertson,
j. LEGALSTUD. BUS. 165,176 n.84 (1997) (citing HUGH S. NORTON, THEWORLD OFTHEECONOMIST
12 (1973)). "Alfred Marshall, author of the first great economics text, Principles ofEconomics, published
in 1890, defined his subject as the study of mankind in the ordinary business of life."John Kay, Everyday
Economics Makes for Good Fun at Parties, FIN. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at 17. Marshall resembles no less
exalted a predecessor than Adam Smith, both in the similarity of their successes, and in their positions
in economic history. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 834 (1976).
313 See JENNIFER BOTHAMLEY, DICTIONARY OF TH4EORIES 395 (1993) (citing GEOFFREY
ROBERTS & ALISTAIR EDWARDS, A NEW DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1991)).
Since the natural sciences do make demonstrable progress along certain fronts, one can expect
that parochialism will be scotched in these fields at some point. But since neither the
humanities nor, I think, the social sciences operate in this self-correcting and progressive
context, ideologies will periodically stifle free inquiry. And we know that there are epochs,
fads, and 'paradigm shifts' even in the natural sciences, which can be construed as phenomena
of shifting mimetic engulfment.
WILSHIRE, supra note 226, at 101.
314 KUHN, supra note 304, at 208.
315 Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Medtod, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1979 (2006).
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B. The Blessings of Diversity
In itsJune 23, 2003, opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,316 the Supreme Court
had 'granted a writ of certiorari317 to resolve the disagreement among the
Courts of Appeals over this question: Is diversity a compelling interest that
can justify a narrowly tailored use of race in the selection of applicants for
admission to public universities? 318 In Grutter, the Court endorsed Justice
Lewis F. Powell's determination in Regents of University of Caifornia v.
Bakke319 that student body diversity," is a compelling state interestjustifying
the consideration of race in university admissions.321 (Needless to say, in
Grutter none of the Justices sought the original understanding of the Civil
War-born text in controversy).3 Petitioner, and the United States, in Grutter
316 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
317 Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
318 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003).
319 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.).
320 Diversity can be approached from, or even celebrated from, different approaches. See, e.g.,
KwAME ANTHONYAPPiAH, COSMOPOuTANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006).
321 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
declined to read a diversity exception (for faculty diversity) to the Title VII prohibition on employment
discrimination. Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir.
1996).
322 Marvin H. Lett, A History of Avoidance, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 23. Some argue that the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would accommodate affirmative action. See, e.g., CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHYEXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS AREWRONG FOR AMERICA
(2005). However, according to the dean of Reconstruction historians, Eric Foner, the Bureau of
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands was born of a tension between interventionist and laissez
faire approaches to Emancipation's aftermath. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 68 (1988).
Not until Congress stood on the verge of adjournment in March 1865, and after many
months of disagreement between House and Senate over its provisions, was the bill
establishing the Freedmen's Bureau adopted. (At the same time, Congress chartered the
Freedmen's Savings Bank to encourage habits of thrift among the former slaves.) The Bureau
was to distribute clothing, food, and fuel to destitute freedmen and oversee 'all subjects'
relating to their condition in the South. Despite its unprecedented responsibilities and
powers, the Bureau was clearly envisioned as a temporary expedient, for not only was its life
span limited to one year, but, incredibly, no budget was appropriated-it would have to draw
funds and staff from the War Department. Charles Summer had proposed establishing the
Bureau as a permanent agency with a secretary of Cabinet rank-an institutionalization of the
nation's responsibility to the freedmen-but such an idea ran counter to strong inhibitions
against long-term guardianship. Indeed, at the last moment, Congress redefined the Bureau's
responsibilities so as to include Southern white refugees as well as freedmen, a vast expansion
of its authority that aimed to counteract the impression of preferential treatment of blacks.
Id. at 69. So how legitimate is affirmative action under this original understanding? Foner's tension
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asserted that the affirmative action plan therein for the University of
Michigan School of Law was not narrowly-tailored, since race-neutral
devices existed to elicit the educational benefits of student body diversity
sought therein. However, narrow tailoring need not demand exhaustion of
every imaginable race-neutral alternative. 323 Narrow tailoring requires sober,
good faith assessment of practical race-neutral options that will deliver the
diversity a university deserves. 324
Grutter observed that the Law School's compelling interest was not
merely to assure some specific proportion of a particular group simply due
to its ethnic origin or race.32s The Law School looked instead to those
consequent educational payoffs which diversity is designed to produce.326
The Michigan affirmative action practice promoted cross-racial under-
standing, aided the breakdown of racial stereotypes, and facilitated students'
better comprehension of people of a different race.327 Numerous studies
demonstrate that student body diversity facilitates learning outcomes.
Diversity better arms graduates for a diverse society and workplace, and
better prepares students professionally.
31
merely marked perpetuation of the antebellum Republican attitudes:
A good number of ambiguities in Republicans' racial attitudes stemmed from the
contradiction between their political outlook, which stressed civil rights and some kind of
legal equality, and the free labor ideology. For even those Republicans most active in efforts
to extend the legal rights of free Negroes insisted that black men must prove themselves
capable of economic advancement before they could expect full recognition of their equality.
[Leading editor Horace] Greeley, for example, criticized black leaders for devoting their time
to the struggle for political rights. Instead, he insisted, they should concern themselves with
self-improvement and character-building, by having black men withdraw from menial trades,
form separate communities, and prove that they could acquire wealth and manage business.
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGYOF THE REPUBLICAN PARTYBEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 298 (1979). See also ROBERT C. WILLIAMS, HORACE GREELEY: CHAMPION OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM (2006).
323 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 329-30 (citing Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
326 Id. at 330.
327 Id.
328 Id. (citing, inter alia, Brieffor American Educational Research Association, et al. asAmici Curiae
3). The discussion in the text accepts, arguendo, the merits of diversity. On the other hand, a grimmer
portrait of the corrosive effects of ethnic diversity is limned by one of the planet's most influential
political scientists, Robert Putnam of Harvard University: "His research shows that the more diverse a
community is, the less likely its inhabitants are to trust anyone from their next-door neighbour to the
town mayor."John Lloyd, Harvard Study Paints Bleak Picture of Ethnic Diversity, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006,
at 1. "Because diversity creates conflict, any creativity gains are swamped by those associated with the
conflict itself" Edward P. Lazear, Diversity and Immigration, in ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
IMMIGRATION 117, 118 n.2 (Georgej. Borjas ed., 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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C. The Critical Mass
The University of Michigan School of Law enrolled a "critical mass"
32 9
of underrepresented minority students to ensure their capacity to render
unique contributions to the School's character.33 It wanted a "critical mass"
of minority students toward assembling a class both broadly diverse and
exceptionally academically qualified.331 Surely, "the Law School's concept of
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity
is designed to produce."332 Michigan did not base its call for the "critical
mass"333 on any supposition that minority students articulate some char-
acteristic minority outlook on any topic.3-4 Quite the reverse: minimizing
the strength of such stereotypes is a central element of the Law School
mission, which cannot be satisfied with only a token total of minority
students.335 Again: "The Law School has determined, based on its experience
and expertise, that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is
necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body."
336
D. The Time Limit
To be sure, racial classifications may be employed no more broadly than
a compelling interest demands. To enshrine a permanent justification for
racial preferences would violate this basic principle of equal protection.
Every government use of race must contain a logical termination point. So,
under Grutter race-conscious admissions policies must be temporally
restricted: 337 "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."
331
329 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
3 Id. at 333.
331 Id. at 329. (citing Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 13).
332 Id. at 330.
333 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 333.
334 Id. (citing Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 30).
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 342.
3 Id. at 343. Justice Harry Blackmun skeptically hoped that affirmative action would have died
nineteen years ago. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (Blackmun, J.). The
Center for Equal Opportunity in Sterling, Virginia, examined undergraduate, law school, and medical
school admissions at the University of Michigan for 1999, and 2003-2005 inclusive. These facts evidence
diehard radical discrimination. The Center's data are available at www.ceousa.org.
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X. GRUTFER INFORMS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HOUSING
How does Grutter inform race-conscious tax incentives to implement
affirmative action in housing? For federal equal protection questions must
arise. First, Grutter recognized (on a constitutional level) the merits of
tailoring race-conscious programs narrowly, and in a context of assessing
such a program's practical, race-neutral alternatives. Here, the protraction
beyond 2007 of the status quo left over from 1968 (de facto housing
segregation) well might be deemed unconscionable. The bankrupt 1968-
2007 policy alternative (a formally, but bootlessly, color-blind housing
market) is, it might be argued, inadequate to enable Americans practically to
live as they wish (in stable, racially-integrated neighborhoods).
Second, Grutter recognized that the University of Michigan Law School
affirmative action practice, which it upheld, was not formulated simply by
the numbers for numbers sake. It was not a structure constructed just to
guarantee the enrollment of a specified percentage of a race or ethnic group.
Michigan geared its pro-diversity affirmative action program toward
educational benefits, and cross-racial understanding. A similar "non-
numbers" benefit to flow from a pro-diversity affirmative action policy in
housing would be the relief of Cose's rage of a privileged class. It would be
the drawing of the poison from what Gay exposes as the physical source of
African-American racial bitterness: "The influence of neighborhood quality
on the salience of race is evidence of the material roots of black racial
identity."3 39 This is a far cry from a numerical mechanism merely to
reshuffle the population's black and white cards.
Third, Grutter recognized that a critical mass of affirmative action
students proved requisite to doing the job for which affirmative action was
inaugurated. Similarly, Gay by most salubrious coincidence recounts that
African-Americans reveal their preferred racial-residential environment:
"The median preferred racial balance is 47% black."3' This metric most
agreeably is congruent with the prospect ofan affirmative action-covenanted
339 Gay, supra note 17, at 559. Political science scholar Gay's language is reminiscent of a famous
passage from history's most influential lawyer: "Just as man's knowledge reflects nature (i.e., developing
matter), which exists independently of him, so man's social knowledge (i.e., his various views and
doctrines-philosophical, religious, political and so forth) reflects the economic system of society. Political
institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation." V.I. LENIN, The Three Sources and Three
Component Parts of Marxism, in 1 V.I. LENIN: SELECTED WORKS IN THREE VOLUMES 66, 67-68 (1970)
(emphases in original).
3Q1 Gay, supra note 17, at 552.
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50-50 checkerboard neighborhood. (To reaffirm: this equal split addresses
relieving the rage of a privileged class, and not numbers for numbers' sake).
Fourth, Grutter recognized the unhealthiness of race-conscious practices,
and the consequent propriety of "sunset thinking" even at their inception.
It announced the Court's expectation that the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action project could expire in 25 years, i.e., by 2028.
(Concededly, even the most impassioned adherents of affirmative action in
higher education341 have indicated since Grutter that racial preferences must
stretch well past 2028).342 How might this relate to an affirmative action-
covenanted 50-50 checkerboard neighborhood? By most salutary coin-
cidence, modem covenants frequently build-in a several decades-later
expiration. 343 Real property restrictive covenants have extended, ordinarily,
for twenty years.
Moreover legal options for promoting affirmative action in housing lie
readily at hand (beyond reliance upon the logic of Grutter) .34 The first
option is a litigant's device. Exercising the interpretive tactic, the advocate
solicits the bench to hold that state courts do not violate the equal protection
clause should they grant relief by injunction or damages to parties seeking
vindication of privately negotiated affirmative action-restrictive covenants.
Why ought state courts to hold so? Because fatal state action would not be
involved.
341 DEREK BOK &WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998).
342 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITYAND
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2006).
343 HETRICK & OUTLAW, supra note 75, at 222. Strikingly common patterns to preferential
policies, including the persistence thereof, are encountered all around the globe:
Preferential programs, even when explicitly and repeatedly defined as "temporary," have
tended not only to persist but also to expand in scope, either embracing more groups, or both.
Even preferential programs established with legally mandated cut-offdates, as in India and
Pakistan, have continued far past those dates by subsequent extensions.
THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15 (1990).
3" MASSEYAND DENTON, supra note 35, at 36.
345 These four points would seem prophylactic against equal protection challenges under Boiling
v. Sharpe, 547 U.S. 497 (1954), to a Congressional enactment entailing racially-related tax credits. But
Grutter reflected the Powell opinion in Bakke before it, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312-14 (1978), by acknowledging the longtime special concern of First Amendment analysis for a
university's academic freedom. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,328-29 (2003). This freedom includes
the right to select students who will, by maximally contributing to the robust exchange of ideas, help
achieve the university's mission of diversity. Id. at 329. Grutter, like Powell's previous opinion in Bakke,
determined that the use of a quota in a race-conscious admission program is not narrowly tailored. Id.
at 334. Cf. Grazt v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-76 (2003). And is there not absent any constitutional
penumbra, cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), favorable to restrictive covenants
(created under state law), similar to the dimension of the First Amendment favorable to the
independence of university admission-decision making?
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The second tool is a Congressional legislative device. By means of
jurisdictional reform, Congress collegially can release the federal judiciary
(including the Supreme Court) from the burden of adjudicating Boiling-
related affirmative action in housing controversies. Associated, at least
speculatively, with the exercise of this legislative option are the names of
John Roberts, and Antonin Scalia.
XI. THE INTERPRETIVE DEVICE: THE COUNSEL OF
PROFESSOR LAURENCE H. TRIBE
The premier constitutional law professor,346 Laurence H. Tribe of
Harvard Law School, in 2000 asserted this position: The subjection to
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny of state court opinions regarding which
contracts are enforceable by injunction,' e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 8 or by
award of damages,349 e.g., Barrows v.Jackson,3 ° is a corollary to a post-1937
Supreme Court synthesis in Constitutional adjudication. 35 ' The insight that
contracts and the law thereof are creatures of the state (notwithstanding the
plain role of private parties in giving them content) smashes the
misperception that when a state judge enforces a contract she simply
executes the bidding of private entities:35 2 "We all now understand that, on
the contrary, that agent is following, perhaps with some leeway taking the
form of permissible discretion, a state-composed script consisting of rules
and principles the sum of which constitutes quintessential 'state action' in
the form of state law."
353
In 1988, Tribe meanwhile had acknowledged (perhaps less philo-
sophically) that ChiefJustice Vinson, writing for the Supreme Court, had
failed to enunciate successfully the reasoning underlying the Shelley
346 KERLOW, supra note 226, at 157. Since 1981, Tribe as a practitioner has charged clients as
much as $525 an hour. Id. at 240.
347 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1357 n.28, § 8-5 (3d ed. 2000).
348 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
349 TRIBE, supra note 347, at 1357 n.28.
350 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
351 See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of the Burger Court: A Study in Constitutional
Functionalism, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 359,359-60,397-99 (1988); George Steven Swan, The Political
Economy of Supreme Court Social Policymaking 1987, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 87, 87-91 (1989). The
common variable to the 1937-2007 American political economy ofa federaijudiciary-enforced, anything-
goes social policy (over, for instance, pornography, abortion, and flag burning), and a congressionally-
managed, nationwide mixed-economy, is this political economy's disdain for mediating institutions. Id.
at 91. See also George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of American Family Policy, 1945-1985, 12
POPULATION AND DEv. REv. 739, 752 (1986).
352 TRIBE, supra note 347, at 1357 n.28.
353 Id. (emphasis in original).
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holding.3" Shelley held that state courts violate the Equal Protection Clause
should they grant injunctive relief to litigants seeking enforcement of
(privately negotiated) racially restrictive covenants.3 5 Commentators and
jurists alike have, characteristically, evaluated Shelley with suspicion.356
(Shelley endured as a more problematic state action case 357 than did, say, New
York Times v. Sullivan).358
Tribe's prosaic approach to state action aimed to identify concisely the
substantive constitutional issue for resolution.35 9 As understood convention-
ally, the Equal Protection Clause demands state neutrality as to race.
Superficially, such mandated neutrality is obtained in a blind judicial
enforcement of a contract restricting the sale of land .3, Were Shelley properly
decided, the reason was either that: (a) neutrality cannot suffice in the matter
of racially segregated housing; or the perhaps more libertarian reading (b)
that the state's contract and property rules were, factually, not neutral in
their embrace of racial restraints on alienation while rejecting numerous
other restraints as non-enforceable. 361 The state contract and property rules
encompassed elaborate doctrines geared to impede the enforcement of
restrictions upon the alienation of land. 362 Restraints on alienability were, in
general, disfavored by the state law.363 But, Tribe emphasizes, "racially
restrictive covenants were included within a special subclass of restraints that
the state courts would not set aside." 364 The Supreme Court's opinion in
Shelley, according to Tribe, meant that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
a state "to make judicial invalidation of private agreements causing racial
segregation just as available as judicial invalidation of other disfavored
restraints on the free alienability of real property."
365
Adoption by Congress of Tribe's latter proposition as explanatory of
Shelley would finesse any equal protection challenge, premised upon Shelley,
to a federal affirmative action in housing statute. Maybe contract law is a
354 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1711 (2d ed. 1988).
355 Id. at 1697.
356 Id. at 1711-12.
357 Id. at 1714.Justices do not define the law simply through their policy preferences, nor through
their precedents, but via the interaction of these two variables. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F.
SPRIGGS, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 130 (2006).
35s 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
339 TRIBE, supra note 354, at 1715.
3W Id. at 1714.
36 Id. at 1714-15.
3Q Id. at 1715.
W Id. at 1488.
M Id. (emphasis in original).
30 Id. (emphasis in original).
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creature of the state. Maybe a private entity entering a contract is following
a script consisting of rules and principles, the sum whereof embodying
quintessential state action incarnated as state law. Yet the federal
enactment-while one embracing racial restraints on alienation-would not
be woven into a fabric of state contract and property rules themselves geared
to limit the enforcement of restrictions against the alienation of land.
Congress, by crisp contrast, would override state law in exercising the
sweeping e Congressional interstate commerce power.367
Nonetheless, what if Congress instructed by Tribe's treatise of 2000
should fear that the advocate's interpretive tactic is too daring? Then,
surgically precise legislative instruments lie readily at hand.
XII. THE JURISDICTIONAL REFORM DEVICE: THE COUNSEL OF
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS
In his then-capacity as Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the
United States, ChiefJusticeJohn Roberts prepared a memorandum entitled,
Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court ofAppellateJurisdiction: An Analysis in Light
of Recent Developments.3" Counselor to the Attorney General Kenneth W.
Starr had recommended that a memorandum be assembled to marshal
arguments favoring the Congressional authority to control the Supreme
Court's appellatejurisdiction. 6 9 The consequent Roberts memorandum was
penned for advocacy purposes. It did not purport to delineate an objective
review of the issue.370
3f6 See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of State-Sanaioned Medical Marijuana:
Gonzales v. Raich, 7 FLORIDA COASTAL L. REv. 473, 532-33 (2006); Swan, The Political Economy of the
Interstate Commerce Clause: United States v. Lopez and United States v. Robertson, supra note 312, at 165;
George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Commerce Clause-Tenth Amendment Tensions: Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 6 HAMLINEJ. PUBLIC L. 199 (1985).
367 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3. Tribe's proposition tends to refurbish Corrigan v. Buckley, 271
U.S. 323 (1926). The sole constitutional issue therein was whether a racially restrictive covenant was
constitutionally vulnerable, Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 329-30 (it was not), instead of whether judicial
enforcement thereof would be invalid. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1948) (as in the context of
Shelley).
368 Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States, Office of the Attorney General, to Kenneth Starr, Attorney General of the United States, Office
of the Attorney General (on file with author), available at http;//www.archives.gov/news/john-
roberts/accession-60-88-0498/014-supreme-court-jurisdiction/folder0l4.pdf#page = 4.
39 Id. at 2.
370 Id. Some posit that Congress invokes indirect methods of influencing the judiciary, rather
than more direct methods such as impeachment or budget-cutting. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH,
WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL
SYSTEM (2006).
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Then-Special Assistant Roberts explained that the Article III, section 2,
exceptions clause371 power of Congress to declare exceptions to Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction37 2 obtains, pursuant to the express language of
that clause, over questions both of law and fact.373 By its terms, the clause
embraces no limit.37 4 This plain and unequivocal wording marks, inevitably,
a stumbling block for anyone construing the clause in a fashion more
restrictive.375 It marks the most potent argument affirming the congressional
authority.376
A. The History
The history of the drafting and the enactment of the exceptions clause
justifies no departure from the overt message of its wording.377 Artful
drafters, the Framers were to have been expected to know how to frame the
more constricted interpretations fancied by latter-day commentators-had
such constructions really have been intended.37' Recognition that the
exceptions clause is not one that is essentially indeterminate and incapable
of fixed or precise definition 379 (such as, e.g., the Due Process Clauses,3 ° or
the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures) 31' is crucial. 3 2
Some critics ordain to contract the range of the exceptions clause by
positing that its solitary purpose was to permit Congress to bar the Supreme
Court from review ofjury determinations of fact.3 3 It cannot be asserted
that the exceptions clause was designed to address objections born of Article
III, section two's grant to the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction both
as to law and fact, because the exceptions clause antedates that problematic
371 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 2.
372 See, e.g., Swan, supra note 211, at 159-60; George Steven Swan, Article III, Secion 2, Exceptions
Clause Canadian Constitutional Parallels: Canada Teaches the United States an American History Lesson, 13
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 37 (1983).
373 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 2.
374 Id. According to DePaul University College of Law Professor Andrew S. Gold, "The
AppellateJurisdiction Clause also seemingly grants Congress unbounded authority to make 'Exceptions'
to the appellate jurisdiction." Andrew S. Gold, AppellateJurisdiction Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO
THE CONSTITUTION 258, 259 (David F. Forte ed., 2005).
375 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 2.
376 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
378 Id.
379 Id.
38D U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
381 U.S. CONST. amend. W.
3M Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 4.
3sM Id.
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language. 38' True, ratification proponents did, in responding to claims the
Supreme Court could violate (by appellate review of fact questions) the right
tojury trial, highlight the exceptions clause. 385 Nevertheless, even were the
Framers troubled over the vulnerability of jury determinations, the
exceptions power they created extended well beyond that specific topic.
31
Statements regarding the exceptions clause by supporters of the Constitution
did not at all hint at a limited ambit to the Congressional sway thereunder
(even if, perhaps, directed to the problem of jury determinations of
questions of fact). 7
Besides, the Judiciary Act of 1789 reached far beyond fact questions in
establishing exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.88 It was
passed in the wake of ratification 38 9 with the involvement of numerous
Framers.3a9 Anyway, the Seventh Amendment of 1791 provides, inter alia,
that "no fact tried by ajury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of
the United States, than according to the rules of common law."391 Had the
aim of the exceptions clause been to insulatejury determinations of fact, the
Framers in 1787 could have taken that direct approach of 179 1.392 From the
outset, Congress has exercised its exceptions power in a substantive fashion,
because Congress never has granted a Supreme Court appellatejurisdiction
over the complete Article IIIjudicial power. 393 'What need, one might query
in 2007, forjudicial review of legislation at all? 94
34 Id. at 5.
385 Id. at 6. "The phrase in the AppellateJurisdiction Clause that raised the most serious concerns
was the grant to the Supreme Court ofappellatej urisdiction 'both as to Law and Fact.'" GOLD, supra note
374, at 258.
M6 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 6.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 7.
389 Indeed, Rhode Island failed to ratify the Constitution until May 29, 1790. LIBRARY OF
AMERICA, THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES,
ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION PART Two 1074 (1993).
390 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 7.
391 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. "Ultimately, the Seventh Amendment and the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment mollified the Anti-Federalists' concerns by removing jury findings of
fact from appellate review." GOLD, supra note 374, at 258-59.
392 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 7.
393 Id. at 12.
394 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346
(2006). U.S. Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., recalled Congress' reaction toMarbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803): "Response from Congress was immediate and forceful. As Representative Caesar
Rodney of Delaware phrased it, 'Judicial supremacy may be made to bow before the strong arm of
legislative authority. We shall discover who is the master of the ship.'" MCCLOSKEY, supra note 112, at
178.
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Also, judicial pronouncements over the exceptions clause support a
Congressional authority to divest the Supreme Court of appellate
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases.395 In Ex pane McCardle,39 during
1869, McCardle was being held in the custody of U.S. Marshalls. Under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, McCardle had applied to the federal circuit
court for habeas corpus relief. As his case was pending in the Supreme
Court, Congress repealed the provisions in the Act of 1867 permitting appeal
to the Supreme Court. 397 The undoubted Congressional aim was preclusion
of a Supreme Court decision in McCardle's case. The Supreme Court
unanimously upheld that exercise of the Congressional power. It clearly
built its opinion upon the exceptions clause.398 The repeal proved effective
even supposing the legislative motive to have been the preclusion of a
possibly offensive Supreme Court ruling on the merits in McCardle.399 In its
McCardle opinion, the Supreme Court considered the exceptions clause
authority plainly at issue, and admitted it a boundless scope.'
In Ex parte Yerger,40' also during 1869, the Supreme Court adhered
explicitly to the Congressional authority to deny it jurisdiction in habeas
corpus cases arising under the Act of 1789 (as well as those arising under the
Act of 1867).4 The McCardle holding, in tandem with language in Yerger
touching upon Congressional authority, vividly signifies that Congress can
wholly divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus
cases.
40
After all, removal of appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court
cannot relieve courts from their duty to respect the supremacy of federal
law.4' State court judges are bound by oath under Article VI4° to support
395 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 8.
3 71 U.S. 506 (1869). This is the seminal opinion on jurisdiction-stripping statutes under the
exceptions clause. GOLD, supra note 374, at 259.
397 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 8.
In the aftermath of the war, with the country bitterly divided over Reconstruction policies,
the Supreme Court found itself again at odds with the Congress. Representative Thaddeus
Stevens, the radical Reconstructionist, at one time spoke of"murderers that are being turned
loose" by a court decision, and Congress went so far as to enact a law depriving the Supreme
Court ofjurisdiction in cases under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
McCLOSKEY, supra note 112, at 182.
39 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 8.
399 Id. at 9.
400 Id.
401 75 U.S. 85 (1868).
4W Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 10.403 Id. at 11.
4 Id. at 16. Furthermore, appellate jurisdictional reform under the Exceptions Clause never
retaliates againstjudges. It reassigns jurisdiction from an errant set ofjudges to another, in whom the
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the Constitution, including its Supremacy Clause. America has surmounted
instances when exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction barred
that Court from guaranteeing a uniform reading of federal law. Between
1789 and 1914, the Supreme Court enjoyed no appellate jurisdiction of any
type over state court decisions striking down state enactments on the basis
of the U.S. Constitution.4" Such an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution
by a state supreme court in direct conflict with a prior opinion from the
United States Supreme Court was unreviewable.
407
Sensitive to the benefits of diversity, Special Assistant Roberts cited
Antonin Scalia:
... Professor Scalia pointed out that Congress could make exceptions
to Supreme Court appellate review in those areas where uniformity
was not necessarily desired. Non-uniformity and diversity
depending on local conditions can be viewed as desirable goals, and
the exceptions clause provides a possible means to that end. Scalia
recognized that non-uniformity in the interpretation of federal law
could be criticized as "sloppy", but asked: compared to what? Given
the choice between non-uniformity and the uniform imposition of
the judicial excesses embodied in Roe v. Wade, Scalia was prepared
to choose the former alternative."
Furthermore, in relieving the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction,
the Congress does not dictate some particular result.' Other courts would
still exercise the capacity to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.410
people repose more confidence. Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor accurately
reminds Americans:
The Framers understood quitewell that withoutjudges who could enforce the Constitutional
rights and guarantees without fear of retaliation, the Constitution would be meaningless. That
is why no term of office was provided for federal judges and that is why judicial salaries for
federaljudges may not be reduced during their service. The many calls for retaliation against
judges for rulings in particular cases, run directly counter to the concept of the Framers of the
Constitution.
Justice O'Connor Speaks Out, THE THIRD BRANCH, May 2006, available at http//www.uscourts.gov/ttb/05-
06/justiceoconnor/index.html.
,4o5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4o Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 16.
407 Id. at 16-17.
408 Id. at 19.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 20.
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Were Congress to divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction, such
initiative would not undercut the whole system ofjudicial review. 411
Too, the Congressional exercises of its Exceptions Clause muscle
remains subject to the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.412 But the equal protection constraint of the
exceptions power cannot be twisted so tightly as to vitiate the exceptions
clause.413 Of interest as to affirmative action is Roberts' grasp of bills
pertaining to Supreme Court appellatejurisdiction and school desegregation.
Appellate jurisdiction reform bills classify on the basis of the kind of case
involved (e.g., school desegregation/restrictive covenant affirmative action).
Although race is a suspect class, a class of cases is not.414
Argues Roberts: "The classification involved does not operate on the
basis of race, and affects both black and white litigants. The point is clearest
so far as exceptions to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction are
considered." 41 5 Furthermore:
It is... difficult to see why that group whose cases are excepted from
Supreme Court review-a group which includes both black and
white litigants, both those in favor of and opposed to any particular
desegregation order-are entitled to the extraordinary protection of
strict scrutiny judicial review. The same is true of that aspect of the
pending bills excluding such cases from the lower federal courts as
well as from Supreme Court appellate review. Both whites and
blacks and both those opposing and seeking relief alleged to
promote desegregation sue in the federal courts, raising claims going
both ways on the merits.46
Suppose Congress in 2007 enacts an affirmative action in housing statute
precluding the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. It is hard to surmise why
that group whose cases are exempted from review-a group which
encompasses both African-American, and Euro-American litigants, and
encompasses both those pro- and con- any specific restrictive covenant-
must be entitled to the extreme protection of strict scrutinyjudicial review.
Why is it difficult? Because both Euro-Americans and African-Americans-
and both those opposing and seeking relief alleged to promote housing
411 Id. at 21.
412 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 397 (1954).
413 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 23.
414 Id. at 24.
415 Id.
416 Id.
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integration-would (otherwise) have been suing in the federal courts,
therein raising claims on the merits cutting in both directions.
'What of appellatejurisdictional reform bills alleged to impinge upon the
exercise of some fundamental right?417 Fundamental rights equal protection
analysis, here, must be premised upon a fundamental right of access to
federal court: "Access to federal court, however, has never been identified
as a fundamental right. The process and that right can be satisfied by access
to state courts."
418
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In the decades since Roberts penned his study, the Supreme Court has
stood aloof from scholarly contest over the exceptions clause. Its precedents
endure. They stand for an inclusive Congressional authority to tether the
Supreme Court's appellatejurisdiction.419 WitnessJusticeJohn Paul Stevens'
opinion on June 29,2006, for the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.42°
The Court denied a governmental motion, made on the ground of§ 1005 (e)
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,421 to dismiss a writ of certiorari.
Simultaneously, Stevens added a conciliatory footnote: "Because we con-
clude that §1005 (e) (1) does not strip federal courts'jurisdiction over cases
pending on the date of the DTA's enactment, we do not decide whether, if
it were otherwise, this Court would nonetheless retain jurisdiction to hear
Hamdan's appeal." 422 So Congress is signaled that the Supreme Court
prudently prepares a retreat from its contestable jurisdiction.
417 Id.
418 Memorandum from Roberts, supra note 368, at 25. A congressional exemption from federal
jurisdiction ofa particular substantive matter (e.g., school bussing) appears more akin to refusing to fund
abortions, while funding other childbirth options, than to cutting offfood stamps from women obtaining
abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also TRIBE,
supra note 347, at 274 n.28.
419 GOLD, supra note 374, at 261. Fittingly, then, on July 19, 2006, the U.S. House of
Representatives voted 260 to 167 in favor of the proposed Pledge Protection Act. That proposed Act
would relieve the federal judiciary ofjurisdiction over cases challenging the Pledge of Allegiance. 152
CONG. REc. H5432 (daily ed. July 19,2006) (review of H.R. 2389).
420 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
421 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
Telephonic interviews with 1,013 adult Americans by Opinion Research Corp. over October
20-22,2006, asked: "Do you think elected officials should have more control over federaljudges and the
decisions they make in court cases, or no more control?" "No more control" was the alternative selected
by 67 percent; "More control" was the alternative selected by 30 percent; and 3 percent held "No
opinion". (Sampling error was +/-3.) Polls: What Do Americans Think of Their Courts?, THE THIRD
BRANCH, November 2006, available at http;//www.uscourts.gov/ttb/11-06/polls/index.html .
422 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 n.15.
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Hamdan is reminiscent of Powell v. McCormack.423 Therein, ChiefJustice
Earl Warren held robustly that the U.S. House of Representatives could not
refuse, on grounds other than those enunciated in the Constitution, to seat
a person duly elected by her constituents.424 Like Hamdan, Powell reads like
a bold vindication of Supreme Court prerogative. But canny Warren
cautiously dropped his own footnote: "Since we conclude that Powell was
excluded from the 90th Congress, we express no view on what limitations
may exist on Congress' power to expel or otherwise punish a member once
he has been seated." 425 The true lesson of Powell was that a timorous
Supreme Court merely called for an empty distinction: Expel, do not
exclude. In Powell, as in Hamdan, a trembling mountain merely brought
forth a mouse.
David Cole, of Georgetown University Law Center, lost no time in
hailing Hamdan: "It is a potent refutation of the Bush doctrine, and a much-
needed resurrection of the rule of law."426 "The fact that the Court decided
the case at all in the face of Congress's efforts to strip the Court ofjuris-
diction is remarkable in itself" 427 Cole long has erred in seeing the rule of
law in what really is a cynical minuet of Congressional-Supreme Court self-
interest.42s Hamdan, like Powell, merely proves a timid Supreme Court
openly prepares a retreat. The Supreme Court fears Congress. Congress
spank.
C. The Future
Happily, this has squared withJustice Stephen Breyer's recent summons
to Americans to exercise their ancient liberty (freedom to participate in
government), with courts taking on enhanced account of Constitution's
423 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
424 Id. at 522.
425 Id. at 507 n.27.
426 David Cole, Why the Court Said No, 53 N.Y. REV. OF BooKs 41, 43 (2006).
427 Id. at 42.
428 Swan, supra note 351 at 161. This Realpolitik minuet continued when Congress responded
to Hamdan v. Rumsfdld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), by deliberately stepping on the toes ofthe Supreme Court.
On October 17, 2006 President George W. Bush executed into law the Military Commissions Act of
2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-366,120 Stat. 2600 (2006). Prof.JohnYoo, rejoiced over how Congress had:
directly reversed Hamdan by making clear that the judiciary cannot take up the Geneva Conventions;
barred courts from reliance upon foreign or international legal opinions, in cases involving military
commissions; stripped thejudiciary's habeasjurisdiction over alien enemy combatants; and marked the
first time since the Civil War wherein Congress had seen fit to narrow the judiciary's habeas power
duringwartime (due to Congressional disagreement withjudicial opinions).JohnYoo, Congress to Courts:
'Get Out of the War on Terror,' WALL ST.J., Oct. 19, 2006, at A18.
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democratic element in their interpretation of the Constitutional text.429 In
2004, the respected scholar43 Larry D. Kramer, Dean of the Stanford
University School of Law, explained that the mere prospect ofjurisdictional
reforms might invigorate popular constitutionalism in the teeth ofjudicial
review:
[A] great irony of making clear that we can and should punish an
overreaching Court is that it will then almost never be necessary to
do so. Rather than more or constant conflict, we will instead see a
different equilibrium emerge, as a risk-averse and potentially
vulnerable Court adjusts its behavior to greater sensitivity on the
part of political leadership in the other branches.43
An activist, progressive Congress can arrange for affirmative action in
housing, notwithstanding any backward-looking Supreme Court stand-patism.
The economic analysis of law teaches that societies do not converge on one
optimal set of institutions as the outcome of competition. The variance among
functionally efficient institutions is inexplicable to economics.432 Hence, stand-
patism is a threat to the requisite creative experimentation.
429 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005).
430 See, e.g., Robert J. Muldoon, Jr., The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review, 90 MASS. L. REV. 44, 47 (2006) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
431 KRAMER, supra note 430, at 253.
432 Capitalism itself does not fully dictate a single, optimal set of instructions on which all
societies will necessarily converge as a result of ever more ruthless competition. There is a
degree of variance among functionally efficient institutions, and the choice that any given
society makes among them is often the result of norms or path-dependencies that economics
as a science cannot explain.
Francis Fukuyama, Still Disenchanted? The Modernity of Postindustrial Capitalism, in THE ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 75, 76 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2005). A nation's legal
tradition, according to one noted scholar of comparative law, (ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW &
COMPARATIVE LAW (1991)), is a variable independent of political, social and economic circumstances.
ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW 186 (1981). Insofar as Western law responds to
political, social and economic factors, it does so (in considerable degree) in terms dictated by the legal
system. Id. at viii, 188.
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XIII. CONCLUSION
A. The Economics
The preceding discussion has appreciated the comprehension of
Professor Michael G. Dawson that African-Americans--even of the middle
class-feel their personal futures to be fused with the future of their race. A
deepened sense of racial group interest (in the apprehension of prosperous
African-Americans) is reinforced by their very advancement in the class
system. Enhanced levels of education for African-Americans would,
presumably, tend to sap the sense of intraracial connection. Still, education
accompanies the evolution of identification in the opposite direction.
African-Americans' dissatisfaction with their residential environment-in
light of what those better-off among them suppose they should be able to
afford-is the material source of African-Americans' enduring racial
identification. Such is the epiphany of political scientist Claudine Gay. If
race-prominence in the minds of successful African-Americans proves a
function of neighborhood socioeconomic phenomena, then racial
irritabilities might be relieved by way of enriched residential payoffs to
successful African-Americans.
Meta questions about a discipline like law or mathematics are not
ordinarily those entailed by that discipline itself.433 They are not legal, nor
mathematical.434 These instead are philosophical queries, residing in
jurisprudence, in the philosophy of science, or in the philosophy of
mathematics.43s The certainty and rigor of mathematics is achieved a priori,
because a mathematician neither relies upon observation for her insights,
nor do her insights themselves encompass observations.436 Philosopher
433 REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, INCOMPLETENESS: THE PROOF AND PARADOX OF KURT GODEL 27
(2005).
434 Id. at 27-28.
435 Id. at 28.
436 Id. at 17.
No experience would count as grounds for revising, for example, that 5 + 7 = 12. Were we
to add up 5 things and 7 things, and get 13 things, we would recount. Should we still, after
repeated recounting, get 13 things we would assume that one of the 12 things had split or that
we were seeing double or dreaming or even going mad. The truth that 5 + 7 = 12 is used to
evaluate counting experiences, not the other way round.
The a priori nature ofmathematics is a complicated, confusing sort of a thing. It's
what makes mathematics so conclusive, so incorrigible: Once proved, a theorem is immune
from empirical revision. There is, in general, a sort of invulnerability that's conferred on
mathematics, precisely because it's a priori.
Id. at 17-18.
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Rebecca Goldstein recently styled mathematicians as supreme in the
topmost turret of the vaulting tower437 of pure reason.438
* . .439Her misconception is a common one. Economics, similarly, is a priori.
As the late, distinguished economist Murray N. Rothbard emphasized:
Economics is praxeological, i.e., its propositions are absolutely
true given the existence of the axioms-the basic axiom being the
existence of human action itself. Economics, therefore, is not and
cannot be "empirical" in the positivist sense, i.e., it cannot establish
some sort of empirical hypothesis which could or could not be true,
and at best is only true approximately. Quantitative, empirico-
historical "laws" are worthless in economics, since they may only be
coincidences of complex facts, and not isolable, repeatable laws
which will hold true in the future.40
437 Id. at 18.
438 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 433, at 16, 18.
439 While economics might be a priori, a professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge,
Simon Blackburn, admits that first premises seldom command a consensus:
Kant denied any important distinction here: for him, you either appealed to
universally shared, unchangeable standards of reason or you manipulated and deceived.
The trouble is that whether or not they are found in arithmetic, logic, and even
science, these hoped-for universal standards are thin on the ground when we come to any
interesting question of politics, religion and morals. Here, the contingent nature of the
contours of our minds, and the role of culture and history in shaping them, are all too
visible-politicians and lawyers must know how to work with them.
Simon Blackburn, The Lie of the Land, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at W6. Who proffers standards of
reason? "Indeed much of the most important work in legal theory is now done not by lawyers but by
political philosophers and economists working both within law schools and within their own academic
departments." RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 34 (2006). In any event, the discipline of
economics was born less an a priori exercise than a function of biology or physical science. See, e.g.,
MARGARET SCHABAS, THE NATURAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMICS 12-13 (2006).
W MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 1 MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 756-57 (1970) (emphasis in
original).
What the economist has in the package is not knowledge but chess. The game of chess is
ruthlessly logical; it will thus be no surprise one day when computers beat the best living
players. Logic, not knowledge, is the province of computers. Chess does not require
knowledge, in the truest sense; it requires elaborate logic. Personnel departments are not
instructed to recruit business candidates from chess clubs; ifa top business executive happens
to be a chess master, that is a coincidence.
WILLIAMJ. HUDSON, BUSINESS WITHOUT ECONOMISTS: AN IRREVERENT GUIDE 51 (1987).
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Business-applied economics" 1 -does grapple with nitty-gritty reality.
Businesspersons, inevitably, miscalculate." 2 But the feedback generated by
the profit and loss system-unlike that feedback from alternative economic
systems-timely rewards accuracy (with profit) and curbs error (with loss).
This is why modern juridical science properly increases society's reliance
upon the mechanisms of the market.
B. The Law
This country's citizenry is prey to governmental pollution of the
atmosphere wherein Americans make their housing choices.443 Local "open
space" laws can narrow the range of alternatives of the would-be home-
buyers of modest means. This market distortion can further fatten privileged
property owners. This is appropriately so, since (as one is reminded by the
44 What the executive must do is to accept full and total responsibility for decisions and for
the knowledge required to make them sound. What the chief researcher must do is abandon
the forecasting ofTruth (guruism) and adopt the role of adjutant to the executive whom he
serves, closely supporting that person's pursuit of fuller knowledge.
The cornerstone of the failure of economists has been the mistaken view that
knowledge does not exist in persons, but only in books, data tables, and computers. Real
knowledge exists only in real people. Businesspeople succeed according to whether they have
full and accurate knowledge of situations. The knowledge they possess is contained in their
own minds, nowhere else. They may have been helped in the formation of that knowledge
bywritten reports, charts, memos, and so on, but it is onlywhat they fully incorporate in their
minds that makes up their living knowledge.
HUDSON, supra note 440, at 50.
42 Douglass C. North, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993, noted:
From 1927 on, and especially in 1929, the investors became convinced that not only was
prosperity here to stay, but that profits could be quickly made by buying a stock that would
be sold at a tremendous profit after it had been bid up by everyone else. It appeared that
everyone entered the stock market to engage in such activities; and as they did, they continued
to bid up the prices. Many speculators bought on margin, borrowing funds, so that with a
very small amount of their own money they acquired large amounts of stock. This was fine
as long as they stocks kept rising: they could pay off the money they owed and still have
substantial profits. But if the stock fell, that was something else again. The stock market
disaster in the fall of 1929 was of an explosive character. There appeared to be no bottom, and
the result was that stocks fell to such depths that they wiped out a tremendous number of
investors and left them heavily indebted. Between 1929 and 1933, approximately four-fifths
of the total value of stock disappeared.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, GROWrH AND WELFARE IN THEAMERICAN PAST: ANEWECONOMICHISTORY
167 (1966). When North writes explosive, he means implosive.
4 Queen's University (Ontario) economist Dan Usher finds "Exploitation by language, religion,
or race originates in the pathology of democratic politics rather than in the pathology of language,
religion, or race." USHER, supra note 277, at 290.
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once-controversial4' legal scholar who won the Nobel Prize in Economics
in 1974,"4 the late Dr. Friedrich A. Hayek), "privilege" derives from "private
law."446 African-Americans are alert to the substantial contribution that
homeownership renders to an ethnic minority's progress. Outrageously,
legal controls upon real estate-meaning, bluntly, government coercion of
flesh and blood women and men--can deter African-Americans from
moving into an area. It can even tend to eliminate numbers of African-
Americans from a town they already call home. The residential colorline is
a major feature in distinguishing African-Americans from their fellow
Americans.
The New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was inau-
gurated on March 4, 1933, 447 spawned federal-level housing credit programs
of notable longevity. In combined effect, these were callously exclusionary
of African-Americans. Open racial discrimination was validated by the
United States government. Also injurious to the aspirations of African-
Americans (for access to homes comparable to that of Euro-Americans) was
the rotten fruit of the G.I. Bill of Rights (also passed during the presidency
of Franklin D. Roosevelt). Incrementally, a network of federal laws helped
solidify the cold reality of defacto segregated housing from coast to coast.
Housing affirmative action might offer an incremental means of
fostering diversity among neighborhoods. Some could transmute into racial
checkerboards. These might exploit, against the white flight so disastrous to
44 See generally HERMAN FINER, ROAD TO REACTION (Greenwood Press 1977) (1945).
445 "He was a notable influence on the economic and political right wing, especially in the 1980s
in Britain." Hayek, Friedrich, in BLACKBURN, supra note 303, at 167.
446 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 154 (1972); see also WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY789 (5th ed. 1948).
447 I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a
stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other
measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my
constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption.
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and
in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of
duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument
to meet the crisis-broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as
the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, First InauguralAddress, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, supra
note 181, at 34. In contemplation of this latter imprecation, "In 1933, Congress granted him those
extraordinary powers, and the fateful analogy between social policy and warfare had begun." Gerald J.
Russello, Garet Garrett: Intellectual Ancestor to Postwar Conservatives, 44 U. BOOKMAN 13, 15 (2006)
(reviewing GARET GARRETT, SALVOS AGAINST THE NEW DEAL: SELECTIONS FROM THE SATURDAY
EVENING POST 1933-1940 and GARETGARRETr, DEFENDAMERICA FIRST: THEANTIWAREDITORIALS
OF THE SATURDAY EVENING POST 1939-1942), available at http'/kirkcenter.org/bookman/44-2-
russello.html.
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the nascent integration of neighborhoods in 2007, the weapon of the racially
restrictive covenant (once brandished by segregationists). Tax policy might
be channeled toward encouraging affirmative action in housing, at least
insofar as racial integrationists can be heartened by the history of Low
Income Housing Tax Credits facilitating economic integration in housing.
Affirmative action in housing would not constitute a welfare system; nor
does the Low Income Housing Tax Credit project. Affirmative action in
housing, being keyed to homebuyers, necessarily would bypass the poorest
Americans; likewise does the Low Income Housing Tax Credit project (for
better or worse).
To date, the affirmative action paradigm is familiar from employment,
and from educational diversity efforts. Affirmative action in housing would
be consistent therewith. It was recognition of an artificial lack of residential
diversity in suburbs that, originally, summoned diversity in student bodies.
Diversity in student bodies was ratified by the Supreme Court as a licit
element in the defense of higher education affirmative action plans,just four
years ago.
Supreme Court precedent as to the racially restrictive covenant (when
covenants were drawn as a segregationist sword) might seem poised against
affirmative action in housing. Yet slaying affirmative action in housing could
be counterproductive. With increasing frequency restrictive covenants are
styled protective covenants. This is because their underlying goal is the
defense of the landowner's property value-an undertaking plainly to be
vindicated from a law and economics perspective.448 When was the phrase
"protective covenant" more vividly descriptive than respecting (a
neighborhood-stabilizing) affirmative action in housing? If covenants are
prescribed for a subdivision, then curbs equally fall upon every property
therein.449 Each holding is protected by, and is benefited by, the covenants.4 0
Happily, Professor Laurence H. Tribe's authoritative work hints at a
road detouring such problematic precedents as Shelley v. Kraemer45 and
Barrows v. Jackson.45 2 Besides, the decades-ago advocacy research of the
Attorney General's boyish Special Assistant John Roberts trumpets the
message that the democratic Congress can smother in advance any federal
judicial challenges to housing affirmative action: Congress can circumvent
the undemocratic federal judiciary itself. Congress is armed with the
fearsome Article III, section 2, exceptions clause power. Authority for the
proposition that the exercise of this power is not taboo has been offered, (so
448 HETRICK & OUTLAW, supra note 75, at 214.
"9 Id.
450 Id.
451 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
452 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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wrote the future Chief Justice Roberts), by the future Associate Justice
Antonin Scalia.453
This nation has suffered the self-inflicted wound of artificial racial
division since 1619. 454 In 2007, let Americans proceed to liquidate politically-
spawned defacto residential segregation. They can attempt to do so via a more
libertarian, alternative legal environment. It could facilitate (yet never
coerce) affirmative action in housing through restrictively covenanted
checkerboard neighborhoods. By 2019, the segregation of 2007 might be
melting away. With stable housing integration convincing everyone that the
sky does not fall upon integrated neighborhoods, white flight could halt.
Race might dramatically diminish as a residential determinant by 2019. No
longer would race be so crushing a factor in partisan fealties.455 Ultimately,
one hopes the covenants (binding the black sheaves to the white sheaves)
themselves would be discarded spontaneously, as legalistic bothers non-
germane to an at last colorblind land.
453 See RALPHA. ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCAIA'SJURISPRUDENCE: TEXTANDTRADITION (2006);
PAUL I. WEIZER, THE OPINIONS OFJUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: THE CAUSTIC CONSERVATIVE (2004);
SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S WITIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE
(Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004).
454 "At Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619, had been landed, in chains, the first slaves from Africa."
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 112, at 139. Bitter was the fruit of this seed. See, e.g., ANTHONY S. PARENT,
FOUL MEANS: THE FORMATION OF A SLAVE SOCIETYIN VIRGINIA, 1660-1740(2003). Some contend
that the intentional suppression of the rights ofAfrican-Americans to the economic advantage ofwhites
remains crucial. FRANCIS D. ADAMS & BARRY SANDERS, ALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE EXCLUSION OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN AWHITE MAN'S LAND, 1619-2000 (2003).
455 "As blacks move in greater numbers to suburbs and Hispanics continue to increase their
numbers, broad-based coalitions become a political necessity." David Gergen &Jeremy Licht, Politics,
Post-Civil Rights, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Apr. 24, 2006, at 40.
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